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DISPARITY RULES
Olatunde C.A. Johnson *
In 1992, Congress required states receiving federal juvenile justice
funds to reduce racial disparities in the confinement rates of minority
juveniles. This provision, now known as the disproportionateminority contact standard (DMC), is potentially more far-reachingthan traditionaldisparate impact standards: It requires the reduction of racial disparities regardless of whether those disparities were motivated by intentional
discriminationorjustified by "legitimate"agency interests. Instead, the statute encourages states to address how their practices exacerbate racial
disadvantage.
This Article casts the DMC standardas a partialresponse to the failure
of constitutionaland statutory standards to discourage actions that produce
racial disparity. A limitation of the disparate impact framework, particularly in the context of Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, is that courts
adopted a narrow view of causation, unwilling to risk holding public actors
responsiblefor broader racial inequality. By contrast the DMC standard,
enforced not through litigationbut throughfederal government oversight and
advocacy by nongovernmental organizations, requires public actors to address how their practices interact with conditions of racial inequality, even
apartfrom their complicity in creating those conditions.
The DMC approach innovatively responds to the complex mechanisms
that sustain contemporary racial inequality. Legal commentary has properly
focused on the role of implicit bias, but this Article argues that one must look
beyond bias to combat structuralpatterns of racial inequality. The Article
concludes by discussingfederal statutes similar to DMC, and suggests that
these approaches might be the manifestation of a new civil rights politics.
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INTRODUCTION

African American welfare recipients have less access to education
and childcare services than their white counterparts and, in the wake of
welfare reform efforts, are less likely to leave welfare for decent-paying
jobs.' Toxic and polluting facilities are more often sited in minority communities, even when controlling for income levels. 2 African American
youths receive longer, harsher sentences than white youths who commit
similar crimes and with similar criminal histories.3 These examples of
contemporary racial disparities illustrate the puzzle of modem day racial
inequity: Disparities in a wide variety of social indicators exist, yet the
causal mechanisms that produce these disparities are not immediately apparent. Racial disparities might result from contemporary bias-either
explicit or implicit. They might stem from historically rooted but lingering patterns of racial inequality (what some commentators loosely call
"institutional racism"). Or, race-correlated differences in behavior might
provide the sole explanation. While a social scientist might undertake an
analysis to further uncover and understand the mechanisms that produce
these disparities, law has traditionally provided poor tools for understanding these mechanisms and prompting public intervention to address racial disparities.
Law's failure in this respect has been the chief frustration of civil
rights legal commentary. Since the Supreme Court's decision in Washington v. Davis,4 the limits of the intent standard in remedying persistent
racial inequities have been a leading preoccupation. 5 In many accounts,
1. See, e.g., Scholar Practitioner Program of the Devolution Initiative, W.K. Kellogg
Found., Racial and Ethnic Disparities in the Era of Devolution: A Persistent Challenge to
Welfare Reform 3 (2001) [hereinafter Racial and Ethnic Disparities in the Era of
Devolution] (documenting that in wake of federal changes in welfare policy African
Americans constitute increasing share of welfare population and spend longer periods on
welfare than their white counterparts); Susan T. Gooden, All Things Not Being Equal:
Differences in Caseworker Support Towards Black and White Clients, Harv. J. Afr. Am.
Pub. Pol'y, 1998, at 23, 23-33 (showing racially disparate treatment by caseworkers in
provision of support services in study of welfare programs); see also id. at 10 (showing that
most of those who left welfare did not earn living wage and that African Americans fared
worse than their Hispanic and white counterparts).
2. See, e.g., Bradford C. Mank, Environmental Justice and Title VI: Making Recipient
Agencies Justify Their Siting Decisions, 73 Tul. L. Rev. 787, 790 n.9 (1999) (collecting
studies). But see id. at 791-92 & n.10 (citing studies finding no racial disparities and
stating that all are based on census data, not on different zip codes).
3. See infra notes 131-132 and accompanying text.
4. 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
5. See, e.g., BarbaraJ. Flagg, "Was Blind, but Now I See": White Race Consciousness
and the Requirement of Discriminatory Intent, 91 Mich. L. Rev. 953, 989 (1993) ("The
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some form of a disparate impact standard-such as the one that exists
under Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act 6-requiring some or all actions producing a disproportionate impact on minority groups to bejustified by government actors is offered as a solution. 7 Yet the emphasis on
disparate impact has always been at odds with the realities of disparate
impact's operation in particular statutory contexts. The disparate impact
doctrine as set up in the Title VII context of Griggs v. Duke Power Co.8 is
quite modest. It does not, of course, ask institutions to refrain from any
actions that perpetuate racial inequality; it only asks that institutions refrain from adopting certain disadvantaging practices and policies if they
cannot be reasonablyjustified. In addition, practical difficulties in satisfying the Griggs standard have meant that disparate impact's reach has
been uneven. 9
position implied by the discriminatory intent rule, that conscious discrimination is
blameworthy but unconscious discrimination is not, is counterproductive of the ultimate
goal of racial justice."); Alan David Freeman, Legitimizing Racial Discrimination Through
Antidiscrimination Law: A Critical Review of Supreme Court Doctrine, 62 Minn. L. Rev.
1049, 1049-50 (1978) (highlighting difficulties of achieving racial justice under rules set
out by Court decisions); Kenneth L. Karst, The Supreme Court, 1976 Term-Foreword:
Equal Citizenship Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 91 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 50-52 (1977)
(arguing that under intent requirement, facially neutral government actions that reinforce
"the stigma of caste" will evade heightened review); Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the
Ego and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 Stan. L. Rev. 317,
321-22 (1987) (arguing that intent standard ignores fact that "a large part of the behavior
that produces racial discrimination is influenced by unconscious racial motivation"); Reva
Siegel, Why Equal Protection No Longer Protects: The Evolving Forms of Status-Enforcing
State Action, 49 Stan. L. Rev. 1111, 1136-37 (1997) (arguing that Supreme Court's form of
discriminatory purpose "is one that the sociological and psychological studies of racial bias
suggest plaintiffs will rarely be able to prove"); David A. Strauss, Discriminatory Intent and
the Taming of Brown, 56 U. Chi. L. Rev. 935, 1015 (1989) (arguing that discriminatory
intent standards are sometimes useful but that Court has "mistakenly adopted the
discriminatory intent standard as a comprehensive account of discrimination" while
ignoring "[n]otions like subordination, stigma, and second-class citizenship"). Other
commentators, while critical of the intent standard, have noted that the Supreme Court
has not applied it consistently so as to pose an insurmountable barrier to relief. See, e.g.,
Sheila Foster, Intent and Incoherence, 72 Tul. L. Rev. 1065, 1084-85 (1998) (finding that
Supreme Court has allowed different levels of consciousness to satisfy intent standard);
Daniel R. Ortiz, The Myth of Intent in Equal Protection, 41 Stan. L. Rev. 1105, 1107 (1989)
(arguing that Supreme Court allocates burden of proof to "make judicial intervention
more likely" in matters involving voting, jury selection, and, sometimes, education).
6. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k) (2000).
7. See, e.g., Flagg, supra note 5, at 993-94 (suggesting "reformist" disparate impact
rule); Siegel, supra note 5, at 1144-45. Disparate impact is not, of course, the only
proposed solution to the problem of intent. Charles Lawrence, for instance, suggests that
courts apply a "cultural meaning" test to help ferret out unconscious bias. See Lawrence,
supra note 5, at 354-55.
8. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
9. See, e.g., Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Structural Turn and the Limits of
Antidiscrimination Law, 94 Cal. L. Rev. 1, 13-14 (2006) (noting that disparate impact
doctrine focuses on discrete employment decisions and difficulty of breaking down most
employment decisions into discrete elements); Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Content of
Our Categories: A Cognitive Bias Approach to Discrimination and Equal Employment
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Beyond the Title VII context, the limitations of disparate impact theory as an alternative to intent seem more fundamental. Disparate impact
has been most daringly used to address racial inequality in the context of
Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, which applies to all recipients of
federal funds. It is Title VI's disparate impact standard that civil rights
advocates utilized to meet intent's shortfall, harnessing the doctrine beyond the usual targets of employment testing and objective employment
criteria to reach actions by governments that had powerful disadvantaging effects on minority communities and individuals.10 Title VI's breadth
appeared to give it power to, in effect, attack the structural dimensions of
race-the way in which government decisions perpetuate racial inequality. Yet, I suggest, the Title VI disparate impact standard assimilated
many of the limitations of the constitutional intent rule, with courts declining to hold governments responsible for structural inequities that
they did not cause.' 1
My aim is not merely to decry the insufficiency of disparate impact
standards, but rather to focus attention on potentially promising regulatory avenues for addressing racial disparities. I begin with the premise
that racial disparities warrant public intervention even when they are not
Opportunity, 47 Stan. L. Rev. 1161, 1162 n.3 (1995) (noting that relatively few employment
cases are amenable to disparate impact theory); Elaine W. Shoben, Disparate Impact
Theory in Employment Discrimination: What's Griggs Still Good For? What Not?, 42
Brandeis L.J. 597, 598-600 (2004) (offering that disparate impact may be "underutilized"
in employment cases because employers have replaced invalid selection devices in
response to Gigg and because practicing bar has not fully appreciated potential of
disparate impact theory, among other reasons).
The empirical picture on the utility of Title VII disparate impact claims is not
altogether clear. John Donohue and Peter Siegelman have shown that far fewer disparate
impact claims are litigated under Title VII than disparate treatment claims. See John J.
Donohue III & Peter Siegelman, The Changing Nature of Employment Discrimination
Litigation, 43 Stan. L. Rev. 983, 998 (1991) (estimating disparate impact doctrine's
"extremely modest" effect on litigation to have generated 101 additional cases in 1989).
Christine Jolls rightly notes that the reliance on the number of disparate impact claims
understates their importance, since most Title VII disparate impact cases involve a
challenge to practices that affect a large group. See Christine Jolls, Commentary,
Antidiscrimination and Accommodation, 115 Harv. L. Rev. 642, 671-72 (2001) (explaining
that "[t]he number of disparate impact claims is not a reliable predictor of their actual
importance" because plaintiffs must show employment practices that disproportionately
harm specific group). Michael Selmi's recent review of Title VII appellate and district
court decisions raising disparate impact claims finds that "[dlisparate impact claims are
more difficult to prove than standard intentional discrimination." Michael Selmi, Was the
Disparate Impact Theory a Mistake?, 53 UCLA L. Rev. 701, 734-42 (2006) [hereinafter
Selmi, Mistake] (reviewing reported appellate and trial decisions over number of years).
10. See infra notes 86-96 and accompanying text.
11. Subsequently, Title VI's disparate impact standard lost much of its practical utility
when the Supreme Court, in Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275 (2001), declined to imply
a private right of action to enforce Title VI's disparate impact regulations. Congress
currently has before it legislation to make clear that Title VI permits disparate impact
claims. See Fairness and Individual Rights Necessary to Ensure a Stronger Society: The
Civil Rights Act of 2004, S. 2088, 108th Cong. (2004).
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explained solely by racial bias. For one, the failure to address pronounced racial disparities can be seen as a denial of equal citizenship. In
this vein, Glenn Loury has observed that the public is mute in the face of
dramatic racial disparities because the harms suffered by African Ameri12
cans are not given equal weight or importance in political discourse.
This fundamental lack of regard for, or failure to care about, the harms
or disadvantages minorities experience reflects the denial of their equal
humanity, acting as an impediment to equal citizenship.
Second, racial disparities warrant public intervention because of the
continuing role of public policy and institutional practices in generating
racial inequality. 13 As public institutions develop and implement social
policy-provide education, reform welfare, develop sentencing policy,
operate juvenile justice systems-they make decisions with racial effects
that are often predictable and easily observable. These public practices
may not "cause" racial inequity in the sense understood by the law of
intentional bias, but they can exacerbate persistent and deeply embedded
patterns of racial inequality. Given the power of these public institutions
to dispense resources, structure opportunity, mete out punishments, and
otherwise shape lives, they have a duty to undertake their decisions with
care, with the consciousness that their practices might have differential
impacts on already disadvantaged communities.
With these premises as a foundation, the primary focus of this Article
is to show that new models of public intervention do, in fact, exist that
take aim at racial disparity in ways that might hold more promise than
traditional disparate impact standards. My prime example is Congress's
surprisingly direct effort to remedy racial disparities in thejuvenile justice
system. In 1992, Congress required states receiving federal juvenile justice funds to implement strategies to reduce disparities in the confinement rates of minority juveniles where those disparities are found to exist. 14 This provision, known as the disproportionate minority contact
standard (DMC), is not often discussed as a civil rights law or grouped
with other laws that prohibit certain actions with a discriminatory effect.
At least at the time of its initial enactment, the law escaped some of the
12. Glenn C. Loury, The Anatomy of Racial Inequality 79-84 (2002) [hereinafter
Loury, Racial Inequality]; see also Paul Brest, The Supreme Court, 1975 Term-Foreword:
In Defense of the Antidiscrimination Principle, 90 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 7 (1976) (describing
"racially selective sympathy and indifference" as process defect worthy of equal protection
review); R.A. Lenhardt, Understanding the Mark: Race, Stigma, and Equality in Context,
79 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 803, 890 (2004) (proposing structured analysis for determining policies
that have racially stigmatizing effects).
13. See discussion infra Part I. That public institutions act in ways that exacerbate
inequality is not uncontested. Some might put full blame on genetic inferiority, individual
failures, or culture differences as an explanation for racial inequality. My aim is not to
rebut all these arguments, but later in the Article I provide support for the role of
contemporary bias and contemporary public practices. See infra text accompanying notes
28-38.
14. See Act of Nov. 4, 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-586, § 2(f) (3) (A) (ii), 106 Stat. 4982,
4993-94 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 5633 (Supp. II 2005)).
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controversy that had plagued other provisions that prohibit practices because of their disparate impact on racial and ethnic minorities. Just a
year before adopting the DMC provision, Congress had been embroiled
in a debate on codifying an effects standard under Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act, raising questions about whether an effects test would place
too steep a cost on employers for practices that produced an unintentional impact on minority groups. 15 The DMC provisions escaped controversy perhaps because, in contrast to Title VII, they seemed modest; they
applied only to state-run juvenile justice programs receiving federal
funds, rather than implicating the practices of thousands of private businesses and employers. But in another sense, the DMC provisions are
quite far-reaching: They announced a standard that requires public actors to reduce racial disparities without specifying whether those disparities were motivated by intentional discrimination, caused by the public
actor or agency, or justified by the agency's legitimate institutional interests. Rather, the statute takes aim at racial disparity by encouraging institutions to gather information about racially disparate effects, information
which then helps reformers and outside advocates better understand the
role of public policies in exacerbating inequality and take informed steps
to intervene.
The DMC statute stems from concerns about minority overrepresentation in the juvenile justice system, and, more concretely, from evidence
that such overrepresentation could not be explained solely by higher
levels of criminal activity. Rather, evidence showed that African Americans were often treated more harshly than similarly situated whites, suggesting, in effect, that the juvenile justice system's practices were complicit in producing inequality. 16 The legislative record does not provide a
comprehensive account of how bias and structural racial inequality might
account for these disparities, but it gestures toward a theory that discrimi15. The Civil Rights Act of 1990 was introduced to codify the disparate impact
standard under Tite VII and sought to correct some of the weakening of the standard
resulting from the Supreme Court's decision in Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490
U.S. 642 (1989), which held, inter alia, that disparate impact plaintiffs bore the burden of
persuasion on the question of business justification even after establishing a prima facie
claim. President George H.W. Bush vetoed the Act, stating it would require employers to
adopt quotas in order to insulate themselves from liability, and Congress sustained the
veto. See Helen Dewar, Senate Upholds Civil Rights Bill Veto, Dooming Measure for 1990,
Wash. Post, Oct. 25, 1990, at A15. In 1991, under political pressure after the Clarence
Thomas confirmation hearings, President Bush signed the Civil Rights Act of 1991, which
was similar to the 1990 bill. See Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, §§ 101-106,
105 Stat. 1071, 1074-75 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e(m), 2000e-2(k) (2000)) (laying
out elements of disparate impact claims and stating that defendants bear burden of
persuasion if plaintiffs make out prima facie case); see also Peter H. Shuck, Affirmative
Action: Past, Present, and Future, 20 Yale L. & Pol'y Rev. 1, 52 (2002) (discussing
enactment of Civil Rights Act of 1991); Andrew M. Dansicker, Note, A Sheep in Wolf's
Clothing: Affirmative Action, Disparate Impact, Quotas and the Civil Rights Act, 25
Colum. J.L. & Soc. Probs. 1, 38-39 (1991) (discussing veto of Civil Rights Act of 1990).
16. See infra notes 157-160 and accompanying text.
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nation (understood as invidious bias) is not an adequate way of cabining
public responsibility for racial inequality. The potential practical power
of the resulting statute is that it provides a mechanism for encouraging a
public institution not only to uncover bias in its practices (both explicit
and implicit), but also to examine more broadly how its practices work to
reproduce or exacerbate racial disadvantage.
Part I of this Article directs attention to the continued role of state
institutions in generating racial inequality. 17 I argue here that while recent legal commentary has placed great emphasis on implicit bias as key
to understanding contemporary racial inequality, even implicit bias theories are inadequate to that task. In addition to examining bias, one must
address how public policies and practices exacerbate embedded, cumulative patterns of racial inequality that persist even in the absence of contemporary bias. Part II discusses how current federal constitutional law
provides little incentive to public actors to consider the racial impact of
their actions; indeed-through its limited conceptualization of causation-it provides incentives for institutions to obscure or avoid knowledge of racial disparities. As has been noted in the commentary, the Supreme Court's narrow interpretation of equal protection reflects
concerns that a constitutional impact standard would require broad restructuring of our social institutions.' 8 My argument is that this same fear
about the reach of constitutional disparate impact standards persists in
judicial interpretations of statutory disparate impact standards. As an example, this Part examines a Title VI challenge to a Texas educational
assessment program which, I argue, illustrates how disparate impact standards are constrained by the fault-based paradigm of intent. For this reason, disparate impact is generally an insufficient mechanism for encouraging institutions to consider how their policies exacerbate racial
inequality.
Part III then argues that, in fact, additional models exist within federal law outside the Griggs-based disparate impact standard. This Part offers the juvenile DMC standard as an example of a regime that seeks to
prompt institutions to address and remedy racial inequality in much
broader ways than the traditional impact standard by requiring institutions to gather and distribute information about racial disparities and to
take affirmative steps to remedy those disparities. This model seeks to
address not only disparities caused by racial bias-the traditional domain
of antidiscrimination law-but also to interrupt a broader set of race-specific patterns of inequality. Part IV argues that the DMC approach can be
17. See Michael K. Brown et al., Whitewashing Race: The Myth of a Color-Blind
Society 19-20 (2003) (discussing ways in which institutions intentionally and
unintentionally generate racial inequality).
18. See, e.g., Daryl J. Levinson, Rights Essentialism and Remedial Equilibration, 99
Colum. L. Rev. 857, 897-99 (1999) (noting concern of Supreme Court that effects test
could invalidate wide range of statutes leading to "wholesale restructuring of the basic
institutions of society").
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observed in contemporary approaches to other problems of racial inequality, and suggests that to address racial inequality, one should consider extending these models further. This final Part also examines the
drawbacks of relying on racial disparity as a point of social intervention.
A spate of recent commentary has decried antidiscrimination law's
failures in addressing contemporary racial inequality and has put faith
broadly in politics or social movements as possible avenues for a solution.1 9 But, of course, politics creates law-the statutory disparate impact
standards of Title VI and Title VII are creations of the political process, as
is the DMC standard discussed in this Article. Rather than opposing law
and politics, this Article suggests that we consider the specific kinds of
legal interventions that might be created by an imagined political change.
The failures of traditional antidiscrimination law need not signal the end
of public regulatory interventions to address racial inequity. This Article,
while acknowledging some of the limitations of DMC, proposes that commentators examine DMC and other emerging approaches that attempt to
respond to the complexities of contemporary race.
I.

GENERATING DisPARiTy

African Americans have experienced significant gains in their social
and economic status over the last forty-five years. 20 They continue, however, to lag behind whites in many measures of social and economic wellbeing.2 1 The frequent cataloguing of racial disparity can promote inaction: Racial disparities can be seen as something to be expected-an understandable vestige of a prior unjust social order-rather than something produced by current policies. Data on racial disparity in health
care status, levels of incarceration, and educational attainment does not
tell us much about the mechanisms that create those disparities. It is only
when more closely examined that racial disparities can provide a clue to
the complex ways in which institutions-particularly public institutions22
contribute to racial inequality.
In examining this complexity, recent legal commentary has focused
on the role of bias that is unconscious or implicit. Commentary on implicit and unconscious bias responds to constitutional law and statutory
disparate treatment frameworks that contemplate discrimination as con19. See, e.g., Bagenstos, supra note 9, at 47 (noting promise in structural approach to
employment discrimination, but concluding that without "a new politics, it is doubtful that
the doctrinal proposals that have emerged from the structural turn will ever have a
meaningful effect on employment discrimination"); Selmi, Mistake, supra note 9, at 780
(arguing that "[w]hat is necessary is a broader social movement that seeks to explain how
pervasive discrimination remains").
20. This Article primarily focuses on African American inequality as compared to
white Americans.
21. See, e.g., Brown et al., supra note 17, at 13-15 (documenting socioeconomic
disparities in income, homeownership, and healthcare access).
22. See id. at 19-20.
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scious, hostile animus, and to popular conceptions that race discrimination is increasingly irrelevant in contemporary American life.23 The notion that discrimination results from unconscious mechanisms begins
with the work of Charles Lawrence, who borrowed from Freudian theory
and cognitive psychology to argue that race discrimination results not
simply from conscious animus, but from subconscious beliefs, attitudes,
and shared cultural values. 24 Subsequently, Linda Krieger, building on
empirical research from social cognition theorists, has argued that intergroup bias does not merely result from "motivational processes," but may
be the inevitable result of "cognitive structures and processes involved in
categorization and information processing."25 The conversation continues to advance with commentators such as Jerry Kang making use of increasingly sophisticated research on the pervasiveness of implicit bias toward socially disfavored groups and also on research showing that such
26
bias has behavioral consequences.
Discussions of implicit or unconscious bias in legal commentary
often focus on its operation in private markets or in the private workplace. 27 Without minimizing the importance of market settings, implicit
bias in government settings-because of the sheer reach of government
policy and programs-likely has even more profound effects in maintaining systemic racial inequality. Controlled studies suggest continued disparities in treatment by public actors that may help explain differences in
various indicators of social well-being. For instance, police search and
detain African Americans more often than similarly situated whites, providing a partial explanation for racial disparities in drug arrests. 28 Minor23. See Ian Ayres, Is Discrimination Elusive?, 55 Stan. L. Rev. 2419, 2420 (2003)
("There is mounting evidence that race-contingent decisionmaking is still a pervasive
factor in many (but not all) facets of everyday life.").
24. See Lawrence, supra note 5, at 322. Lawrence relies on Freudian theory for the
notion that the unconscious self holds onto racist beliefs even as the conscious self knows
that these beliefs are wrong, and on cognitive psychology which tells us that pervasive
cultural stereotypes can be "transmitted by tacit understandings" which, "because they have
never been articulated, are less likely to be experienced at a conscious level." Id. at
322-23.
25. Krieger, supra note 9, at 1187.
26. See, e.g., Jerry Kang, Trojan Horses of Race, 118 Harv. L. Rev. 1489, 1505-17
(2005) (discussing various developments in measuring implicit biases); see also Cass R.
Sunstein & Christine Jolls, The Law of Implicit Bias, 94 Cal. L. Rev. 969, 971-73 (2006)
(discussing evidence of implicit racial bias from Implicit Association Test (IAT)).
27. This is primarily because the cognitive bias approach is most developed in the
area of employment. See, e.g., Krieger, supra note 9, at 1165 (arguing that disparate
treatment framework used in employment discrimination cases erroneously assumes that
discrimination is motivational rather than cognitive).
28. See, e.g., Peter Verniero & Paul H. Zoubek, Office of the Att'y Gen. of the State of
N.J., Interim Report of the State Police Review Team Regarding Allegations of Racial
Profiling 25-29 (1999), available at http://www.state.nj.us/lps/intm-419.pdf (on file with
the Columbia Law Review) (collecting "Stop, Arrest, and Search" data across races); Eliot
Spitzer, Office of the Att'y Gen. of the State of N.Y., The New York City Police
Department's "Stop & Frisk" Practices (1999), available at http://www.oag.state.ny.us/
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ity status proves more salient than income levels in explaining the siting
of environmentally burdensome facilities.2 9 Controlling for relevant factors, studies have found that black welfare recipients are given less access
to employment and education services than are their white counterparts,
differences that might affect the rate at which African American women
are able to leave welfare for gainful employment.3 0 And, as discussed in
Part IV, African American youth in the juvenile justice system are given
harsher, more restrictive dispositions than are their white counterparts,
31
when controlling for relevant factors such as the offense committed.
These studies suggest that the disparities are in part caused by bias, possibly unconscious, in the implementation of social policies.
Yet bias-even implicit bias-is too limited a way of capturing the
complex mechanisms that produce racial disparity in particular areas.
While recent legal commentary has made much use of research from cognitive psychology, cognitive bias fails to address how institutional arrangements and ongoing practices interact with longstanding, persistent patterns of racial inequality. 32 In legal commentary, this terrain beyond bias
is sometimes referred to broadly as "institutional racism." 33 But "institutional racism" like the infamous "amorphous societal discrimination"press/reports/stop_frisk/stop_frisk.html
(on file with the Columbia Law Review)
(comparing stop rates of whites and minorities); see also Brandon Garrett, Remedying
Racial Profiling, 33 Colum. Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 41, 51-53 (2001) (describing problem of
racial profiling in New Jersey).
29. See, e.g., Comm'n for Racial Justice, United Church of Christ, Toxic Wastes and
Race in the United States 15-17 (1987) (finding that socioeconomic status played
important role in location of commercial hazardous waste facilities, but that race was more
significant factor); Benjamin A. Goldman & Laura J. Fitton, Toxic Wastes and Race
Revisited: An Update of the 1987 Report on the Racial and Socioeconomic Characteristics
of Communities with Hazardous Waste Sites 2 (1994), available at http://
www.stateaction.org/publications/pdf/toxicwastes.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law
Review) (finding that during period "people of color became even more disproportionately
represented in communities with toxic waste facilities"); see also U.S. Gen. Accounting
Office, GAO/RCED-83-168, Siting of Hazardous Waste Landfills and Their Correlation
with Racial and Economic Status of Surrounding Communities app. I (1983) (collecting
relevant data from "four hazardous waste sites"); Mank, supra note 2, at 790 n.9 (collecting
studies).
30. See, e.g., Gooden, supra note 1, at 27-33 (providing evidence of racially disparate
treatment by caseworkers in provision of information about self-sufficiency services
(education, employment, and transportation assistance) to women receiving assistance
under federal Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) program). For a
discussion of TANF, see infra notes 198-202 and accompanying text.
31. See infra notes 131-132 and accompanying text.
32. Jerry Kang acknowledges this point, when he notes that: "Durable inequality may
also be maintained by structural arrangements that are no longer tightly connected to bias,
implicit or explicit. Implicit bias should not circumscribe the content of our concerns."
See Kang, supra note 26, at 1593.
33. Rachel F. Moran, The Elusive Nature of Discrimination, 55 Stan. L. Rev. 2365,
2413 (2003) ("[TIhe key challenge [of race scholars] is to move from the phrase
'institutional racism' to comprehensive accounts of the patterns and practices that
generate racial disadvantage in public institutions, market settings, and private life.").
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the impermissible rationale for race-based affirmative action 34-also has
limitations. The term conjures racial disparity that is too pervasive to be
quantified or remedied. But much of how race operates and how disparities are generated by particular institutions is knowable.3 5 Decades of discrimination have created a social structure that shapes in distinctly racial
terms where people live, 3 6 their access to wealth and social welfare programs,3 7 their educational resources, and the networks and social capital
that enable employment and mobility. 38 Much like recent efforts to understand gender- and race-based inequalities as a partial function of workplace structures,3 9 racial inequalities across a variety of social and economic areas can be addressed by understanding the specific ways in
which government policies and practices interact with this social structure of race. 40 As I discuss in Part IV, racial disparities in the juvenile
justice system are created in part by bias, likely unconscious, but also by
34. See Michael Selmi, Remedying Societal Discrimination Through the Spending
Power, 80 N.C. L. Rev. 1575, 1582-601 (2002) (cataloguing affirmative action cases
holding that "societal discrimination" is not a compelling interest). But cf. Clark D.
Cunningham, Glenn C. Loury &John David Skrentny, Passing Strict Scrutiny: Using Social
Science to Design Affirmative Action Programs, 90 Geo. L.J. 835, 857 (2002) (arguing that
affirmative action cases should not be read to hold that remedying "societal
discrimination" is uncompelling but rather that affirmative action plans at issue were
inadequately tailored to that goal).
35. But cf. Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 756 n.2 (1974) (Stewart, J., concurring)
(noting that causes of segregation are "unknown and perhaps unknowable").
36. See, e.g., Douglas S. Massey & Nancy A. Denton, American Apartheid:
Segregation and the Making of the Underclass 3, 7-9 (1993) (contending that residential
segregation is primary factor in creation and perpetuation of so-called "urban
underclass"); see also id. at 222 tbl.8.1 (presenting data showing general stasis or only small
declines in black-white segregation in thirty metropolitan areas from 1970 to 1990).
37. See, e.g., Brown et al., supra note 17, at 74-80 (describing discrimination in
distribution of veterans' benefits and housing benefits during post-World War II era and
into 1960s); Ira Katznelson, When Affirmative Action Was White 25-52 (2005) (describing
black exclusion from social and economic programs of New Deal and post-World War 1I
era); Melvin L. Oliver & Thomas M. Shapiro, Black Wealth/White Wealth: A New
Perspective on Racial Inequality 50-52 (1995) (describing how exclusion of blacks from
key methods of asset accumulation, e.g., home ownership and access to self-employment,
has resulted in persistent gap in wealth between blacks and whites).
38. See, e.g., Deirdre A. Royster, Race and the Invisible Hand: How White Networks
Exclude Black Men from Blue-Collar Jobs 144-78 (2003); Glenn C. Loury, Discrimination
in the Post-Civil Rights Era: Beyond Market Interactions, J. Econ. Persp., Spring 1998, at
117, 118 (urging consideration of social capital and notjust labor market discrimination in
explaining income-based inequality).
39. See Bagenstos, supra note 9, at 2. For a prominent example, see Susan Sturm,
Second Generation Employment Discrimination: A Structural Approach, 101 Colum. L.
Rev. 458, 470-71 (2001) (describing how "ongoing patterns of interaction shaped by
organizational culture . . .influence workplace conditions, access, and opportunities for
advancement over time" (footnote omitted)).
40. See Brown et al., supra note 17, at 19 ("Any analysis of racial inequality that
routinely neglects organizations and practices that, intentionally or unintentionally,
generate or maintain racial inequalities over long periods of time is incomplete and
misleading.").
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the way in which government decisions-sentencing policy, for instance-affect minority communities that are poorer, are less likely to be
composed of two-parent families, have less access to private counsel, and
so on. 41 We may lack the proper language for describing the process by
which institutions generate unequal outcomes-"discrimination" seems
to suggest only bias and "institutional racism" seems too vague. 42 Given
this language vacuum, the only hope may be to trace with much greater
differential sociospecificity43 how our social policies interact with racially
44
economic conditions and access to opportunity.
Unpacking with greater specificity how racial disparities are generated also might help counter the inclination to accept disparities as a
given, a vestige of an inherited unjust social order. As later discussed, the
story of DMC lends support to this idea: The legislative history suggests
that DMC was, at least in large part, the response to research showing that
similarly situated youth were treated differently within the justice system.
Providing such data would not, of course, be sufficient to counter policies
motivated by racial hostility, yet such an approach might help to unsettle
at least those policies that persist because of a lack of regard for minority
groups. As Glenn Loury explains, racial inequality persists because racial
disparities fail to produce consternation, and because the differential racial impacts of social policies are met with indifference. 45 One way of
addressing racial inequality then is by highlighting that these disparities
41. See infra notes 134-144 and accompanying text.
42. Glenn Loury has suggested that discrimination be "demoted, dislodged from its
current prominent place in the conceptual discourse on racial inequality in American life,"
arguing that the concept of "development bias"-the unequal chance to realize one's
productive potential-is a better way to explain the persistence of racial inequality. See
Loury, Racial Inequality, supra note 12, at 92-93. Similarly, Loury explains that his
concept of "stigma" is a better way to understand persistent inequality than discrimination
or bias: "The stigma idea is more flexible, providing insight both into race-constrained
social interactions and race-influenced processes of social cognition. Thinking in terms of
stigma helps us to better understand the operations of causal feedback loops that can
perpetuate racial inequality from one generation to the next." Id. at 160.
43. Cf. Ian Ayres, Pervasive Prejudice?: Unconventional Evidence of Race and
Gender Discrimination 425-26 (2001) [hereinafter Ayres, Pervasive Prejudice] (arguing
for greater efforts to quantify role of contemporary discrimination in marketplace).
44. See William Julius Wilson, The Bridge Over the Racial Divide: Rising Inequality
and Coalition Politics 98 (1999) (discussing "social structure of inequality"); see also
Brown et al., supra note 17, at 19-22 (describing how small policy decisions interact to
create cumulative racial inequalities).
45. Loury describes racial inequality as maintained by "a disregard for the effects of a
policy choice on the welfare of persons in different racial groups." Loury, Racial
Inequality, supra note 12, at 166. Loury explains: "A racial group is stigmatized when it
can experience an alarming disparity in some social indicators, and yet that disparity
occasion no societal reflection upon the extent to which that circumstance signals
something having gone awry in OUR structures...." Id. at 83. Loury illustrates this point
in discussing racial disparities in incarceration rates:
Dramatic racial disparity in imprisonment rates does not occasion more public
angst, I claim, because this circumstance does not strike the typical American
observer at the cognitive level as being counterintuitive. It does not to a sufficient
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are in fact created and maintained by contemporary public practices. To
the extent that racial disparities reflect racial stigma-who a disfavored
minority "at the deepest cognitive level [is] understood to be" 46-highlighting
the mechanisms that sustain racial inequality will not, of course, lead to
the immediate eradication of the problem. Building on the specific example of DMC which I discuss in greater detail in Part III, my suggestion
is that presenting specific empirical information of how social policies
generate racial inequality can provide a first step.
In sum, data on the fact of racial disparity does not by itself tell us
much about the mechanisms that sustain racial inequality, nor alone lead
to change. Such information can, as later discussed, provide a point of
departure for addressing the complex ways in which public practices generate or maintain racial inequality.
II.

FEENE'S LEGACY

Traditional law provides little incentive for public institutions to address how their policies and practices perpetuate racial inequality. Constitutional law is, of course, concerned only with those racial disparities
caused by a public actor's intentional discrimination. Moreover, I suggest
that even statutory disparate impact rules, while seemingly far-reaching,
are effectively constrained by judicial concerns that broad disparate impact rules might render the government liable for racial disparities that it
did not cause.
A. The Feeney Problem
The failure of the constitutional regime to provide a remedy for contemporary racial disparities has been the subject of extensive commentary, most of which centers on the limitations of Washington v. Davis.4 7
The Supreme Court in Davis made clear that, standing alone, the discriminatory effects of a policy would not be sufficient to violate the Equal
degree disappoint some deeply held, taken-for-granted expectations and
assumptions about the nature of our society.
Id. at 81.. For the argument that constitutional law should account for racial stigma, rather
than intentional discrimination, as the main source of racial harm, see generally Lenhardt,
supra note 12, at 809.
Legal commentary also relies on the concept of indifference. For Paul Brest, "racially
selective . . . indifference[,] the unconscious failure to extend to a minority the same
recognition of humanity, and hence the same sympathy and care, given as a matter of
course to one's own group," amounts to a process defect that, in his argument, should be
constitutionally remediable. Brest, supra note 12, at 7-8. And in Charles Lawrence's
account, indifference to the racial harm generated by state decisions or laws-which for
Lawrence stems from unconscious biases-is the condition that preexists racial harm. See
Lawrence, supra note 5, at 354-55; see also id. at 322-23 (describing his theory of race
discrimination as resulting not simply from conscious animus, but from subconscious
beliefs and attitudes about racial groups).
46. Loury, Racial Inequality, supra note 12, at 167.
47. 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
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Protection Clause. 48 To some extent, the Court's decision a year later in
49
Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan HousingDevelopment Corp. mitigates the difficulty of meeting that test in holding that invidious purpose
could be inferred from circumstantial evidence, including evidence of
disparate impact. 50 But just two years after Arlington Heights, the Court
narrowed the formulation of discriminatory purpose in PersonnelAdministratorof Massachusettsv. Feeney.5 1 Feeney held that an absolute lifetime preference for veterans in civil service jobs in Massachusetts, which excluded
virtually all women from 60% of public jobs in the state, did not violate
the Equal Protection Clause. 52 Rejecting the plaintiffs' argument that the
impact on women's employment opportunities was "too inevitable to
have been unintended," the Court defined intent to require more than
awareness of the impact or even reckless disregard of foreseeable impact. 53 Instead, the Court required that "the decisionmaker ... selected
or reaffirmed a particular course of action at least in part 'because of,'
54
not merely 'in spite of,' its adverse effects upon an identifiable group."
As other commentators have noted, Feeney's definition of intent as
"because of, not in spite of' requires "a legislative state of mind akin to
48. See id. at 242 ("Disproportionate impact is not irrelevant, but it is not the sole
touchstone of an invidious racial discrimination forbidden by the Constitution."). The
Court, while noting that disparate impact may be relevant to invidious discriminatory
purpose, stated that "we have not held that a law, neutral on its face and serving ends
otherwise within the power of government to pursue, is invalid under the Equal Protection
Clause simply because it may affect a greater proportion of one race than of another." Id.
49. 429 U.S. 252, 265-66 (1977).
50. Arlington Heights allows that "[t]he impact of the official action-whether it 'bears
more heavily on one race than another'-may provide an important starting point [for
determining invidious discriminatory purpose]." Id. at 266 (citation omitted) (quoting
Davis, 426 U.S. at 242). The Arlington Heights Court explains that invidious purpose could
be implied not only from the fact of impact, but from looking at the processes surrounding
the adoption of a decision, the historical background leading to the decision, whether
there were procedural or substantive departures from normal procedures, and the
legislative or administrative history surrounding adoption of the decision. Id. at 266-68.
51. 442 U.S. 256 (1979). By making insufficient the inferences to be drawn from
indirect evidence of discrimination, Feeney takes away much of what Arlington Heights
allowed. See id. at 280 (considering "totality of [relevant] legislative actions" and
concluding no discriminatory purpose existed).
52. The preference was defined in gender inclusive language ("'any person, male or
female, including a nurse'"), and women who served in official United States military units
during wartime were eligible for the preference. Id. at 268. Yet because of the small
number of women involved in military units during wartime, the overwhelming majority
(ninety-eight percent) of veterans in the state were men and the statute benefited "an
overwhelmingly male class." Id. at 269; see also id. at 269 n.21 (discussing limited role of
women in military units). The Court acknowledged that a veterans' hiring preference was
"inherently... gender-biased," but concluded that the State's decision to "intentionally
incorporate [ ] into its public employment policies the panoply of sex-based and assertedly
discriminatory federal laws that have prevented all but a handful of women from becoming
veterans" was not sufficient to show discriminatory purpose. Id. at 276-77.
53. Id. at 276.
54. Id. at 279.
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malice." 55 In that sense, the problem with Feeney is that it is unresponsive
to unconscious discrimination. 56 One cannot prevail under a malice
standard by pointing out that the government would likely not adopt a
provision that would deny ninety-eight percent of all men preferences for
publicjobs. A related limitation of Feeney is that it is unresponsive to the
structural aspects of inequality: the embeddedness of gender inequality
in the social structure. The history of discrimination in the armed services, which helps to create the gender disparity of the veterans' preference, becomes irrelevant.5 7 By holding that discriminatory purpose requires more than knowledge of disparate impact ("awareness of
consequences"),58 but rather action taken specifically to harm a particular group, Feeney provides little incentive to public actors to consider how
their policies help maintain or generate racial inequality or to adopt policies to mitigate those impacts.
The Court's decision a few years later in McCleskey v. Kemp, where the
Court rejected a claim of racial discrimination in the administration of
the death penalty, shows how Feeney's formulation provides disincentives
to examine racial impacts. 59 The petitioner in McCleskey, a black man
sentenced to death in Georgia for the killing of a white police officer,
challenged Georgia's administration of the death penalty as racially discriminatory. 60 In rejecting the plaintiffs equal protection claim, the
Court held that even if the plaintiffs evidence that race was a key deter55. Siegel, supra note 5, at 1135.
56. See Foster, supra note 5, at 1083-84 (suggesting Feeney requires subjective
evidence of legislature's discriminatory purpose); Siegel, supra note 5, at 1134-35
(suggesting Feeney requires an "express purpose" and "state of mind"). Siegel observes that
after Feeney a plaintiff could not prevail simply by showing that "legislators had acted with
unconscious bias of the sort Paul Brest had termed 'selective sympathy and indifference.'"
Id. at 1134 (quoting Brest, supra note 12, at 7-8). Similarly, Cass Sunstein has noted that
Feeney's intent test "disregards the phenomenon of selective racial care and indifference."
Cass R. Sunstein, Lochner's Legacy, 87 Colum. L. Rev. 873, 897 n.119 (1987) ("[T]he
equality question should be whether the actor would have made the decision regardless of
which group was helped and which hurt. Such an inquiry would also turn on intent, but it
would call into question a larger number of government decisions."). Note that after
Davis, legal process scholars like Paul Brest suggest that an intent standard is not
inconsistent with the invalidation of legislative actions motivated by selective racial
indifference, see Brest, supra note 12, at 14-15, but Feeney's definition of intent is
inconsistent with this view.
57. Similarly, the Court acknowledged that the "enlistment policies of the Armed
Services may well have discriminated on the basis of sex," but that discrimination was not
caused by the veterans' preference itself, and the "history of discrimination against women
in the military is not on trial in this case." Feeney, 442 U.S. at 278. To the Court, plaintiffs
could not prevail by showing that the policy was indifferent to its absorption of a
discriminatory status quo or that the law had been adopted in the face of its foreseeably
exclusionary effects. Rather, the plaintiffs would have to show that the preference was
adopted in order "to exclude women from significant public jobs." Id. at 277.
58. Id. at 279.
59. 481 U.S. 279 (1987).
60. See id. at 279-80 (identifying McClesky's challenges under Eighth and
Fourteenth Amendments).
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minant in sentencing for the death penalty were true, this would not be
sufficient to establish that the state had a discriminatory purpose. 61 It was
not sufficient to show that the death penalty was maintained in the face of
this disparity. Rather, the Court would have required that the plaintiff
show that the Georgia legislature had "enacted or maintained the death
62
penalty statute because of an anticipated racially discriminatory effect."
Under the McCleskey-Feeney formulation, public actors need not be aware
face of known discriminaof racial disparities, and in fact, inaction in the
63
tory effects will not violate equal protection.
Feeney and McCleskey reflect concerns about the comparative competence of courts to remedy disparate racial impacts, 64 but also about the
redistributive reach of a constitutional disparate impact standard that
61. Id. at 298-99 (concluding that sentencing's "alleged[] discriminatory
application" would not itself sustain equal protection challenge). McClesky's evidence
included the Baldus study, which examined 2,000 murder cases in Georgia and found that
defendants charged with killing white persons were substantially more likely to receive the
death penalty. See id. at 286-87. Controlling for a range of variables, the Baldus study
found that defendants charged with killing whites were 4.3 times more likely to receive the
death penalty than those charged with killing blacks. Id. at 287.
62. Id. at 298.
63. The McCleskey dissent notes that the majority's holding will do little to prompt
states to address disparities in the administration of criminal justice. Justice Stevens notes
that a finding that the system was racially discriminatory might prompt the State to limit
the death penalty to certain categories where race-based imposition was less likely. See id.
at 367 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Blackmun, who would find the evidence sufficient
to lead to an inference of discriminatory purpose by prosecutors in seeking the death
penalty, suggests that as a remedy prosecutors could develop a consistent set of guidelines
in exercising their discretion to seek the death penalty. See id. at 365 (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting). Indeed, the majority's holding seems designed to avoid subjecting public
practices to an analysis of racial impact. The majority openly worries that allowing
McCleskey's claim would destabilize other criminal justice penalties. Id. at 315 (majority
opinion). By contrast, to the dissent, prompting public examination of racial effects is a
positive: The possibility of additional constitutional challenges might "lead to a closer
examination of the effects of racial considerations throughout the criminal justice system,"
potentially benefiting "the system, and hence society." Id. at 365 (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting).
64. The Feeney Court notes that "[t]he calculus of effects, the manner in which a
particular law reverberates in a society, is a legislative and not a judicial responsibility."
Pers. Admin'r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 272 (1979). This concern about judicial
competence begins with the Davis Court's direction that disparate impact rules "should
await legislative prescription." Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 248 (1976). As Robert
Post and Reva Siegel put the point, these statements reflect that the Court's "embrace of
discriminatory purpose doctrine is rooted in concerns relating to the institutional
legitimacy and competence of Article III courts." Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel, Equal
Protection by Law: Federal Antidiscrimination Legislation After Morrison and Kimel, 110
Yale L.J. 441, 471 (2000). Post and Siegel contend that the Davis line of cases suggests a
role for legislatures in making judgments about what violates the Equal Protection Clause
that may differ from that of the Supreme Court. See id. at 469 ("[T]he doctrine of
discriminatory purpose is not justified by the requirements of the Equal Protection Clause,
but by reference to the particular institutional limitations of the Court as a
nonrepresentative body within a democracy.").
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would potentially apply to a broad range of actions. 65 This concern is
evident in the Davis Court's argument that a constitutional rule would
destabilize too many public policies and statutes. 66 McCleskey too is con67
cerned with what Justice Brennan in dissent calls "too much justice" the concern that allowing McCleskey to prevail would open up many ad68
ditional challenges to the fairness of the criminal justice system.
I revisit these concerns not to reopen discussions of preferable alternative constitutional standards, 69 but rather to suggest that these concerns may hamper judicial implementation of any disparate impact standard. Disparate impact standards are often touted as a solution to the
requirement of intent, yet their potency has been limited both by practical difficulties in establishing disparate effect, and, more fundamentally
by judicial concern with cabining government responsibility for remedying structural racial inequities. We see this most compellingly in attempts
by civil rights advocates to use the disparate impact standard of Title VI of
the 1964 Civil Rights Act to, in effect, counter the limitations of the constitutional intent standard.
B. Title VT: Power and Limits
Most scholarly discussion of disparate impact standards center on
Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act. Title VII's disparate impact standard was first given shape by the Supreme Court in Griggs v. Duke Power
Co., 70 and, after a series of Supreme Court decisions in the late 1980s
narrowing the scope of Griggs,7 1 Congress responded by explicitly codifying the Griggs standard. 72 Title VII's disparate impact standard is some73
times cast as having far-reaching power to shape employment practices,
65. See Levinson, supra note 18, at 897-99 (arguing that equal protection impact rule
reflects institutional concerns about potential breadth of any remedy for racial inequality);
see also id. at 899 ("Once existing racial inequality becomes a matter of equal protection
concern, it is hard to imagine any nonarbitrary stopping point ... short of... wholesale
restructuring of... basic institutions of society to redistribute resources and power more
fairly ....[T]his is not [a] project courts would be inclined (or allowed) to undertake.").
66. See Davis, 426 U.S. at 248.
67. 481 U.S. at 339 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
68. Id. at 315 (majority opinion).
69. For proposals of alternative constitutional approaches, see, e.g., Lawrence, supra
note 5, at 365-68 (recommending that courts apply "cultural meaning test"); Lenhardt,
supra note 12, at 878-82 (stating that courts should evaluate racially stigmatic meaning of
particular law or policy).
70. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
71. See, e.g., Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 656-58 (stiffening
burden of proof for employees attempting to prove discrimination with disparate impact
test).
72. See Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 105, 105 Stat. 1071, 1074
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k) (2000)).
73. See, e.g., Alfred W. Blumrosen, The Legacy of Griggs: Social Progress and
Subjective Judgments, 63 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 1, 1-2 (1987) (arguing that "[f]ew decisions of
our time . . . have had such momentous social consequences"). Even more recent
commentary assumes that the theory has been successful in shaping employer behavior.
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but a spate of recent commentary has challenged both the practical utility
of the standard in changing employment practices, and whether the theory underlying Griggs-never well-defined-has the normative power to
move beyond fault-based conceptions of equality inherent in the intent
standard.7 4 As a result, several commentators have concluded that Title
VII disparate impact theory has had little impact outside of the area of
written employment tests, many of which were not validated and thus
that practices with a disparate imcould not meet Griggs's requirement 75
pact be justified by business necessity.
My interest, here, is in the operation of disparate impact theory
under Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, because Title VI is the federal
statute most specifically concerned with discrimination and racial disparities generated by public actors. Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act prohibits racial discrimination in federal agencies and by recipients of federal funds, 7 6 and thus applies to a broader range of public regulatory
See, e.g., Jolls, supra note 9, at 652 (finding that "important aspects of disparate impact law
are in fact accommodation requirements" because they require employers "to incur special
costs in response to the distinctive needs or circumstances ... of particular groups").
74. See, e.g., Bagenstos, supra note 9, at 21-26 (discussing "courts' unwillingness to
engage in rigorous scrutiny of employers' subjective employment practices"); see also id. at
45 (arguing that courts are hostile to disparate impact law because they are wedded to
.paradigm of a fault-based understanding of 'discrimination'"); Selmi, Mistake, supra note
9, at 705-07 ("Outside of the original context in which [disparate impact] theory arose....
[it] has produced no substantial social change and there is no reason to think that
extending the theory to other contexts would have produced meaningful reform.");
George Rutherglen, Abolition in a Different Voice, 78 Va. L. Rev. 1463, 1476 (1992) (book
review) (noting that Title VII disparate impact standard worked great changes until it was
made more challenging by series of Supreme Court decisions in late 1970s); see also
Richard A. Primus, Equal Protection and Disparate Impact: Round Three, 117 Harv. L.
Rev. 493, 530-32 (2003) ("Rather than aiming to integrate the workplace, perhaps
disparate impact doctrine should be understood as aiming only to foster as much
integration as would occur if employers stopped using unjustified business practices that
reinforced the effects of historical discrimination.").
75. Title VI and Title VII are not, of course, the only examples of civil rights laws with
effects tests. Arguably the most successful effects test is the one contained in the Voting
Rights Act, see Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-205, 96 Stat. 131
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1973), which does not follow the Griggs framework.
The Fair Housing Act does not contain an explicit effects test in its regulation or statute,
but it has been construed by most circuits to allow disparate impact causes of action. See
generally Dana L. Kaersvang, The Fair Housing Act and Disparate Impact in Homeowners
Insurance, 104 Mich. L. Rev. 1993, 2007 n.117 (2006) (citing cases applying disparate
impact theory to Fair Housing Act claims).
76. Section 601 of Title VI prohibits discrimination based on race, color, or national
origin in any "program or activity" receiving "Federal financial assistance." 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000d. Federal financial assistance includes not only federal grants, but loans and
indirect assistance such as federal financial aid to students or Medicaid reimbursements.
See, e.g., Grove City Coll. v. Bell, 465 U.S. 555, 575 (1984) (holding that Title IXmodeled on Title VI-applies where institution's students receive federal financial
assistance); Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 45 C.F.R. § 80.6 (2005) (setting forth
disparate impact regulations).
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contexts than Title VII. 77 Because it can reach into almost as many areas
as a constitutional impact rule, a Title VI effect rule has the power to
encourage public decisionmaking that is attentive to racial disparities,
and to reach toward the goal of disestablishing state-maintained racial
inequality. 78 If part of the goal of disparate impact theory is to encourage
a broad range of institutions to change their practices to help to achieve
racial equality, 79 it is Title VI's disparate impact standard that could best
be marshaled to achieve that goal. The Supreme Court eventually held in
Alexander v. Sandoval that Title VI's disparate impact standard was not
privately enforceable, though it remains enforceable at the administrative
level.80 And Congress currently has legislation before it to make explicit
that Title VI's disparate impact standard can be privately enforced. Yet,
even before Sandoval the Title VI disparate impact standard, while almost
certainly an improvement over the intent standard, was subject to judicial
interpretations that limited its power to encourage public actors to address racial disparities. A key problem, as a recent commentator has
noted, is the lack of explicit guidelines by agencies for enforcing Title VI
disparate impact.8 ' More broadly, the theory underlying Title VI disparate impact has never been well articulated by administrative agencies or
77. At the time of Title VI's enactment, Congress was primarily concerned with
segregated education, see Charles F. Abernathy, Title VI and the Constitution: A
Regulatory Model for Defining "Discrimination," 70 Geo. L.J. 1, 1 (1981), and, to a lesser
extent, discrimination in hospitals, see Kenneth Wing, Tide VI and Health Facilities:
Forms Without Substance, 30 Hastings L.J. 137, 152 n.56, 153 n.58 (1978) (documenting
legislative concern with prohibiting discrimination in health care, particularly in hospital
services). But the statute was written broadly to prohibit discrimination in all federally
funded programs. Subsequent amendments to Title VI make clear that the statute is not
limited to the particular program or unit receiving federal funds, but applies to all of an
entity's operations and programs. The Supreme Court in Grove City had interpreted the
.program or activity" requirement in Title IX-which is modeled on Title VI-narrowly, as
limited to the particular office or program receiving federal funds, but in 1988, Congress
passed the Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987 to correct Grove City's interpretation. See
Pub. L. No. 100-259, § 6, 102 Stat. 28, 31 (1988) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-4a)
(defining "program or activity" under Tide VI, Title IX, and Section 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act to include "all . . . operations" of an entity, "any part of which is
extended Federal financial assistance").
78. In calling for the enactment of Title VI, President Kennedy argued that "[s]imple
justice requires that public funds, to which all taxpayers of all races contribute, not be
spent in any fashion which encourages, entrenches, subsidizes, or results in racial
discrimination." H.R. Doc. No. 88-124, at 12 (1963).
79. See Selmi, Mistake, supra note 9, at 712 (discussing origins of disparate impact
theory and its goal of providing opportunities to African Americans); Siegel, supra note 5,
at 1145 (arguing that if Supreme Court had adopted disparate impact theory as matter of
constitutional law, equal protection litigation might have led to elimination of historic
patterns of race and gender stratification).
80. 532 U.S. 275 (2001).
81. See Charles F. Abernathy, Legal Realism and the Failure of the "Effects" Test for
Discrimination, 94 Geo. L.J. 267, 286-97 (2006) [hereinafter Abernathy, Legal Realism]
(arguing that lack of explicit guidelines requires judges to engage in "an ad hoc balancing"
of practice's harm to minorities against its social benefit).
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by courts, in particular the extent to which Title VI disparate impact theory extends beyond fault-based conceptions of intent. As I discuss below,
with this lack of clarity, some courts appeared reluctant to use Title VI to
require public actors to remedy racial disparities that they did not cause.
Title VI's breadth and its potential power derive from its application
to a wide range of funding programs. Most federal agencies that provide
funding to states and localities have adopted regulations under Title VI
prohibiting the use of "criteria or other methods of administration which
have the effect of subjecting individuals to discrimination because of
their race, color, or national origin,"8 2 and, in giving meaning to those
regulations, courts have adopted the Griggs framework of proof.8 3 Despite its broad application, until the 1980s there was little attempt to judicially enforce Title VI's statutory requirements, much less to enforce Title
VI's effects regulation, 84 leading some to call Title VI the "sleeping giant"
of civil rights.8

5

82. Dep't of Justice, 28 C.F.R. § 42.104(b)(2) (2005) (Justice Department
regulations); see Dep't of Health and Human Servs., 45 C.F.R. § 80.3(b)(3) (2005)
(regulations promulgated by the Department of Health and Human Services). Title VI
does not define the prohibited discrimination but, in section 602 of the Act, directs
agencies that distribute federal funds to "effectuate" the regulations by issuing "rules,
regulations, or orders of general applicability." 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-1. Congress required
presidential approval of the regulations, and also directed that the regulations be
.consistent with achievement of the objectives of the statute authorizing the financial
assistance." Id.
83. See Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563, 566-67 (1974) (applying Griggs standard,
without discussion, to Tide VI impact case); Powell v. Ridge, 189 F.3d 387, 393 (3d Cir.
1999) ("[T] he courts of appeals have generally agreed that the parties' respective burdens
in a Title VI disparate impact case should follow those developed in Title VII cases."); see
also Ga. State Conference of Branches of NAACP v. Georgia, 775 F.2d 1403, 1418 (11th
Cir. 1985) (applying Griggs to Title VI litigation); Larry P. v. Riles, 793 F.2d 969, 982 & n.9
(9th Cir. 1984) (same).
84. One commentator suggests that Title VI was relatively underutilized by private
litigants because the statute contains no explicit private right of action, and there was
uncertainty about its enforceability prior to the Court's decision in Cannon v. University of
Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 717 (1979), implying a private right of action under Tide IX (which
is modeled on Title VI). See Alan Jenkins, Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964: Racial
Discrimination in Federally Funded Programs, in Civil Rights Litigation and Attorney's
Fees Annual Handbook 173, 180 (Steven Saltzman & Barbara M. Wolvovitz eds., 1995).
Compare Clark v. Louisa County Sch. Bd., 472 F. Supp. 321, 323 (E.D. Va. 1979) (finding
pre-Cannon that Tide VI did not provide private right of action), with Concerned Tenants
Ass'n of Indian Trails Apartments v. Indian Trails Apartments, 496 F. Supp. 522, 526-27
(N.D. I11.
1980) (implying cause of action for declaratory and injunctive relief, but not
money damages). Not until the decisions in Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Service Commision of
New York, 463 U.S. 582 (1983) (plurality opinion), and Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287
(1985), did the Court clarify that the Title VI statute itself prohibited only intentional
discrimination, while the agency regulations allowed actions based on "unjustifiable
disparate impact." See Alexander, 469 U.S. at 293.
85. Maurice R. Dyson, Leave No Child Behind: Normative Proposals to Link
Educational Adequacy Claims and High Stakes Assessment Due Process Challenges, 7 Tex.
J. C.L. & C.R. 1, 25 (2002); The Forum Debriefs Deval Patrick, Civ. Rts. F., Winter 1997, at
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Beginning in the 1980s, however, scholars and advocates began to
focus on the potential use of Title VI's disparate impact test to challenge
racial disparities in the allocation of environmental burdens. 6 In other
cases, Title VI's disparate impact standard has been used to challenge
discrimination in the siting of highway facilities,8 7 the closing of hospitals
serving high-minority communities, 8 8 and the use of IQ tests to place
black school children in classes for the mentally retarded.8 9 Until the
Supreme Court's 2001 decision in Alexander v. Sandoval, which declined
to imply a private right of action to enforce Title VI's effects regulation, 90
the hope among civil rights proponents was that Title VI could systemically be employed to address racial inequities in public health and insurance programs, education, and transportation programs. 9 1
The faith in Title VI's disparate impact regulations was not altogether misplaced. A handful of important cases succeeded under the disparate impact approach, most of which would likely have stumbled if intent had to be proved, and none of which could easily have been brought
under other civil rights statutes.9 2 A powerful example of the potential
use of Title VI's disparate impact regulations is the 1994 suit challenging
the decision of the Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority (MTA) to raise bus fares serving predominantly minority communities, and, more broadly, the MTA's allocation of funds to rail systems at
http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/cor/Pubs/forum/97win.htm (on file with the Columbia Law
Review).
86. See, e.g., James H. Colopy, The Road Less Traveled: Pursuing Environmental
Justice Through Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 13 Stan. Envd. L.J. 125, 152-56
(1994) (urging use of Title VI effects test as alternative to Equal Protection Clause).
87. See Coal. of Concerned Citizens Against 1-670 v. Damian, 608 F. Supp. 110,
127-29 (S.D. Ohio 1984) (accepting defendant's proffered justification for selecting
predominantly minority community for location of highway).
88. See Bryan v. Koch, 627 F.2d 612, 619 (2d Cir. 1980) (finding that city
demonstrated appropriateness of its choice to close hospital serving high-minority
community).
89. See Larry P. v. Riles, 793 F.2d 969, 981-83 (9th Cir. 1984) (upholding district
court's finding of Title VI violation).
90. 532 U.S. 275, 293 (2001). For a critique of the Court's decision in Sandoval, see
Pamela S. Karlan, Disarming the Private Attorney General, 2003 U. Ill. L. Rev. 183, 198
(critiquing Court's emphasis "on whether § 602 creates individual rights, rather than
whether it contemplates allowing private parties to enforce the obligations that regulations
impose on the recipients of federal funds"). In dissent in Sandoval,Justice Stevens suggests
that Title VI's regulations could be enforced using § 1983. See Sandoval, 532 U.S. at
299-300 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The Court's 2002 decision in Gonzaga University v. Doe,
536 U.S. 273, 285 (2002), threatens this route to enforcement through its holding that the
§ 1983 analysis of whether Congress intended to create an enforceable right is no different
than in the implied right of action cases. See also S. Camden Citizens in Action v. N.J.
Dep't of Envtl. Prot., 274 F.3d 771, 774 (3d Cir. 2001) (finding that § 1983 could not be
used to enforce disparate impact regulations).
91. Jenkins, supra note 84, at 173.
92. See, e.g., Lany P., 793 F.2d at 981-83.
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the expense of minority bus riders. 93 The MTA actions in the case could
be characterized as a classic example of racially selective indifferencethe development of transportation policy without meaningful analysis or
concern for the needs of racial minorities. 94 After plaintiffs brought suit
under Title VI, relying on both an intent and an effects theory, and
under the Equal Protection Clause, the district court enjoined the MTA
from raising bus fares, holding that the plaintiffs were likely to succeed in
their claim that the proposed increase in bus fares violated Title VI's effects regulation. 95 After considerable public and political pressure was
brought to bear, 96 the MTA settled the case, signing a consent decree
with terms favorable to the plaintiffs. The decree established goals to
improve bus services by halting fare increases, expanding service, and decreasing overcrowding. The Title VI effects claim likely played a significant role in creating the conditions for adoption of the consent decree.
From the MTA case one can imagine how ajudicially enforced Title
VI disparate impact rule might create incentives for public institutions to
consider whether they are applying their policies in a racially selective
manner, and to consider how to mitigate racial impacts through examination and evaluation of alternatives. Yet, even before Sandoval, Title VI

93. The case began when the Board of the MTA voted to raise bus fares by twentythree percent (from $1.10 to $1.35) and to eliminate monthly passes that enabled frequent
riders to save money. See Labor/Cmty. Strategy Ctr. v. L.A. County Metro. Transp. Auth.,
No. 94-05936-TJH, slip op. at 1 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 21, 1994) (Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law re: Preliminary Injunction).
94. Eric Mann, head of the Labor/Community Strategy Center, noted in describing
the case:
[R]acism is mainly the politics of impact, rather than overt behavior-which is
why it's so hard to prove legally. The MTA didn't sit around and say "Let's hurt
people of color." They said, "Let's drain the budget and put it all [rail funds]
into our own districts." We were the ones who had to stand up and say, "Wait a
minute. Do you understand the effect of your actions?"
Karen Klabin, Back of the Bus: Eric Mann Gives the MTA a Run for Its Money, L.A. View,
Jan. 12-18, 1996, at 7. According to one account, the public hearing preceding the
decision to raise fares points to official indifference: While poor, minority, and disabled
bus riders were often emotional in their pleas against fare increases, MTA board members
were "distracted, laughing with each other and eating-often taking little notice of the
testimony being delivered before them." Penda Hair, Louder than Words: Lawyers,
Communities and the Struggle forJustice 89 (2001) (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
95. See Labor/Cmty. Strategy Ctr., No. 94-05936-TJH, at 4-5. The disparate impact
claim relied on evidence showing that the MTA's actions had a statistically significant
adverse impact on bus riders, who were more likely to be minority (and poor) while
benefiting white, middle-class commuters. The plaintiffs also argued that the evidence of
disparate funding subsidies for services to predominantly minority commuters violated
Title VI adverse impact. In finding that a preliminary injunction was warranted, the court
also found that the plaintiffs had raised "serious questions" on the merits of their
intentional discrimination claim. Id. at 5.
96. See Hair, supra note 94, at 93-97 (describing campaign to force settlement
involving media coverage, political advocacy, and public protests).
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claims were never easy to win. 9 7 For one, as in the Title VII context, the
Griggs standard is hard to satisfy98 and courts tend to defer to the defendant's justifications. 99 Second, there is a more fundamental limitation of
the Griggs approach that becomes particularly apparent in the context of
Title VI: The very questions posed by the Griggs approach-involving primarily an institution's justification for its practices-are ill-suited to examine the complex questions that underlie disparate impact cases, specifically the way in which government policies and practices (e.g., a decision
to grant a permit to a polluting facility or to fund transportation services)
interact with the structure of race in American society (e.g., residential
segregation or racial disparities in poverty rates). Because of its application to a broad array of regulatory contexts, Title VI disparate impact
theory risks appearing like disparate impact theory uncabined, provoking
judicial concerns about whether it would require the judiciary to broadly
restructure social institutions-echoing the Court's concerns in Feeney
and Davis.
An example of how Title VI disparate impact assimilated the limitations of the constitutional regime in addressing structural racial inequities can be found in GI Forum v. Texas Education Agency, an unsuccessful
challenge to Texas's high school graduation exit exam (known at the
time as the Texas Assessment of Academic Skills (TAAS)), a test that African American and Latino students disproportionately failed. 0 0 The
97. See Abernathy, Legal Realism, supra note 81, at 294 ("[L]ower appellate courts
shied away from the effects test in a remarkably stark pattern."); see also id. at 312
(reviewing appellate court decisions and finding consistent pattern of courts sustaining
government's interest over plaintiffs' claim of disparate impact).
98. For instance, there are challenges in generating the statistics necessary to make an
appropriate comparison between populations necessary to satisfy the first step of the Griggs
standard. See, e.g., N.Y. Urban League, Inc. v. New York, 71 F.3d 1031, 1038 (2d Cir.
1995) (finding no disparity between subsidies for commuter rail and subsidies for subway
commuters where plaintiffs had failed to determine "the extent to which one system might
have higher costs associated with its operations"). One commentator who advocates a
disparate impact rule has noted the difficulties that the Supreme Court's approach to the
relevant labor market raises in proving adverse effects and would allow proof of disparate
effects based on comparison to the general population pool. See Flagg, supra note 5, at
995-96.
99. See, e.g., Ga. State Conference of Branches of NAACP v. Georgia, 775 F.2d 1403,
1420 (11th Cir. 1985) (finding that state's achievement grouping system was educationally
justified). One commentator notes in the Title VI context, "[iun practice, many courts
have been disturbingly deferential to defendants in reviewing their asserted justifications
for discriminatory policies, often inferring institutional necessity from scant evidence and
unsubstantiated rationales." Jenkins, supra note 84, at 189; see also id. at 190-91
(comparing deference in Georgia State Conference, 775 F.2d at 1420, with scrutiny in Larry P.
v. Riles, 793 F.2d 969 (9th Cir. 1984)). What seems like deference might, of course, simply
reflect a failure of proof by plaintiffs in these cases, or contested understandings of the
legal standard of institutional necessity.
100. 87 F. Supp. 2d 667 (W.D. Tex. 2000). Even in the MTA case, the plaintiffs'
disparate impact claim was buttressed by evidence of intentional discrimination. See
Labor/Cmty. Strategy Ctr., No. 94-05936-TJH, at 5 (granting preliminary injunction after
finding that "plaintiffs raise serious questions going to the merits of their disparate impact
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TAAS test was the culmination of decades of education reforms in Texas,
similar to those taking place in other states and in federal programs, that
center on improving school accountability for student progress.10 1 Students are required, after up to eight attempts, to pass the three portions
of the exit level version of TAAS-reading, writing, and math-before
they can graduate from high school, regardless of their high school
grades)10 2 The State Board of Education then relies on the test, among
03
other factors, to rate the performance of schools and school districts.'
Several Mexican American organizations and students10 4 brought suit in
a Texas District Court arguing that the test violated Title VI's disparate
impact standard.10 5 While there were some differences in their analyses,
claim under Tide VI, as well as their intentional discrimination claim [s]"); see also Labor/
Cmty. Strategy Ctr. v. L.A. County Metro. Transp. Auth., 263 F.3d 1041, 1043 (9th Cir.
2001) (characterizing case as involving claim of "intentional[ I] neglect[ ]" of inner-city
minority bus riders). Finally, though impossible to quantify, the advocacy efforts
surrounding the case-a model of combining litigation with extensive community
organizing, media advocacy, and political advocacy-may have been the central factor in
persuading the Authority to settle this case. See Hair, supra note 94, at 94 (describing "key
elements" of winning strategy as research expertise, public pressure, and media coverage);
Eric Mann, Radical Social Movements and the Responsibility of Progressive Intellectuals,
32 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 761, 780-84 (1999) (providing account of organizing and other
advocacy efforts by lead organizer of MTA suit).
101. In 1984, the Texas legislature passed an education reform law that, among other
reforms, established a statewide curriculum, required teachers to pass proficiency tests,
and implemented an "exit" test (known as the Texas Educational Assessment of Minimum
Skills (TEAMS)), passage of which was required for receipt of a high school diploma. See
GIForum, 87 F. Supp. 2d at 671; Keith L. Cruse &Jon S. Twing, The History of Statewide
Achievement Testing in Texas, 13 Applied Measurement in Educ. 327, 329-30 (2000);
Walt Haney, The Myth of the Texas Miracle in Education, Educ. Pol'y Analysis, Aug. 19,
2000, at Part 2, at http://epaa.asu.edu/epaa/v8n41/part2.htm (on file with the Columbia
Law Review). In 1990, Texas designed a new test to replace the TEAMS test known as
TAAS. TAAS, developed by a national testing company with substantial involvement by
Texas educators, was intended to measure higher-order thinking and problem solving
skills rather than simply measuring basic skills. See GI Forum, 87 F. Supp. 2d at 671-72;
Haney, supra.
102. GIForum, 87 F. Supp. 2d at 673. Students are first administered the exit level
TAAS exam in the tenth grade, and are given seven additional attempts to pass the exam
before their scheduled graduation date. Id.; Cruse & Twing, supra note 101, at 330
(noting that exit level tests were moved to tenth grade in 1994).
103. See Haney, supra note 101. Schools rated as low performing in two consecutive
years are subject to sanctions. Id. State law requires that schools disaggregate student
performance data by race, ethnicity, and socioeconomic status, and schools are rated on
whether they achieve success for all subgroups. Id.
104. The plaintiffs included an organization of Mexican American veterans, an
educational advocacy organization for Mexican Americans, and nine Texas minority
students who did not pass the TAAS test before their scheduled graduation date, and were
represented by the Mexican American Legal Defense Fund. See GI Forum, 87 F. Supp. 2d
at 668 & n.1.
105. Id. at 667. The plaintiffs also argued that the test was intentionally
discriminatory and that it violated due process. Id. The court dismissed the equal
protection and Title VI intentional discrimination claims on summary judgment, but held
a trial on the Title VI disparate impact and due process claims. Id. at 681 n.l1, 683 n.12.
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both plaintiffs' and defendants' experts agreed that the first administration of the test had a significant adverse impact on minorities, 0 6 and that
significant, though lower, racial and ethnic disparities existed in the cumulative passage rates. 10 7 The court agreed that the plaintiffs had made
out a prima facie case that the TAAS test had a disproportionate impact
on minority students. 10 8
On the question of whether the adverse impact was educationally
justified, however, the court was persuaded by the state's argument that
the TAAS Exit Test was intended "to hold schools, students, and teachers
accountable for education and to ensure that all Texas students receive
the same, adequate learning opportunities," 10 9 and it rejected the plaintiffs' attempts to prove that the test was not necessary to further accountability and was not a valid measure of student learning. 110 The test, the
106. Adverse impact was measured using the eighty percent rule, the rule generally
applicable in employment cases which considers whether the selection for any race,
gender, or ethnic group is less than four-fifths (or eighty percent) of the rate for the group
with the higher selection rate. In 1998, for instance, the tenth grade white passage rate for
all three tests was eighty-five percent. The black passage rate was fifty-five percent and the
Hispanic passage rate fifty-nine percent, which are below eighty percent of white pass rates
(sixty-eight percent passage). Haney, supra note 101, at Part 3, at http://epaa.asu.edu/
epaa/v8n41/part3.htm. The plaintiffs' experts also presented evidence that these
differences were statistically significant, see id., and that these differences had "practical
significance" because "there were at least 45,000 students since 1994 who would have
completed their high school diplomas but for the TAAS Exit Test." Plaintiffs' Post-Trial
Brief at 9-10, GIForum, 87 F. Supp. 2d 667 (No. SA-97-CA-1278EP). In addition, plaintiffs
presented evidence that minority dropout rates increased after the implementation of the
TAAS Exit Test. See id. at 13-14 (explaining that gap between white and minority rates of
high school completion went from fifteen percent in early 1980s to twenty-two percent
after implementation of TAAS Exit Test, with "most precipitous increases" occurring
"immediately after the implementation of the TAAS Exit Test").
107. Plaintiffs' Post-Trial Brief, supra note 106, at 9-10.
108. See GI Forum, 87 F. Supp. 2d at 676 (stating that "'no rigid mathematical
threshold of disproportionality . . . must be met to demonstrate a sufficiently adverse
impact'" (omission in original) (quoting Cureton v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 37 F.
Supp. 2d 687, 697 (E.D. Pa. 1999), rev'd on other grounds, 198 F.3d 107 (3d Cir. 1999)));
see also id. at 679 ("The variances are not only large and disconcerting, they also
apparently cut across such factors as socioeconomics.").
109. Id. at 679.
110. First, plaintiffs argued that using TAAS as a diploma requirement, rather than as
an indicator of whether students had learned certain materials, was not necessary to
further accountability or monitoring of schools. Second, plaintiffs contended that the exit
test did not assure the legitimacy of a high school diploma, pointing to evidence indicating
that grade point averages and teacher evaluations were better indicators of student success
and ability to do college work. Third, the plaintiffs sought to demonstrate that the TAAS
Exit Test had negative educational effects, including the increase that had led to a rise in
the attrition rates of minority students. Finally, plaintiffs presented expert evidence that
the test lacked construct validity. Specifically, they argued that the test was not content
valid because it failed to test what students learned in schools; that the test lacked criterion
validity because the test score did not relate to other criteria such as student grades or
performance on other tests; and that the defendants had provided no proof of predictive
validity-that is, that the test helped predict later performance in college or work. As part
of the argument that the test lacked content validity, the plaintiffs presented evidence that
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court held, validly measured a set of skills and knowledge that the state
has deemed of value, and the use of cutoff scores represented the state's
considered judgment and was based on input from educators and field
test data."' The court also found that the use of the test as a "highstakes" graduation requirement was justified on the ground that it
"boosted student morale and encouraged learning." 112 Finally, the court
rejected the plaintiffs' proffer of equally effective alternatives (for example the use of a sliding-scale system that would allow graduation decisions
to be made from grades along with test scores rather than just using a cutoff score), holding that the plaintiffs had failed to present evidence that
these alternatives would sufficiently motivate schools and teachers to pro113
vide a quality education and motivate students to learn.
In short, the plaintiffs did not persuade the court that the defendants lacked a legitimate justification for a practice that produced a disparate impact. This can be read as a failure of plaintiffs' proof: The court
found, for instance, that the plaintiffs had provided insufficient evidence
to counter the defendant's claims that the test motivated students, and
had failed to establish that the test contributed to student attrition. 114 It
also can be read as a function of the court's deference to the state's asserted rationale: The court found that "assertions" by the defendants as
to the educational interests served by the test were sufficient to meet the
state's burden of showing that the test was justified. 15
Behind the failure of proof, however, lie concerns about judicial
competence and the broad reach of disparate impact rules that are in
many ways evocative of Feeney. Despite the fact that defendants bear the
burden of proof on the question ofjustification, the court deferred to the
state's justifications, repeatedly explaining that deference to the state's
policy choices was appropriate given that the case involved state decisions
on questions of education. 1 6 In disposing of plaintiffs' argument that
minorities, because of racial and ethnic disparities in access to education,
African Americans and Hispanics had less opportunity to learn the test materials: They
were more likely to attend low-performing schools with lower percentages of certified
teachers and fewer resources. Plaintiffs also argued that the use of the test as a graduation
requirement and the cutoff score (seventy percent) were not educationally valid. See
Plaintiffs' Post-Trial Brief, supra note 106, at 13-15, 33, 35-38, 43.
111. GIForum, 87 F. Supp. 2d at 679-81.
112. Id. at 681.
113. Id. at 681-82.
114. The court held that the plaintiffs had failed to demonstrate that the TAAS
increased minority drop-out and retention rates. See id. at 681.
115. Id. at 680 ("[T]he assessment of legislatively established minimum skills as a
requisite for graduation .. .[is] well within the State's power and authority.").
116. See, e.g., id. (deferring to state's determination of appropriate cutoff score for
passage of test); id. at 670 ("[T] he court cannot pass on the State's determination of what,
or how much, knowledge must be acquired prior to high school graduation."); id. at 671
(finding that resolution of case "turns not on the relative validity of the parties' views on
education but on the State's right to pursue educational policies that it legitimately
believes are in the best interests of Texas students").
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had less of an opportunity to learn the test material than their white
counterparts, the court demanded something like satisfaction of the
Feeney standard. According to the court, the disparities in access to education would be relevant only if there were "some link between the TAAS
test and these disparities," which would have to be established via a showing, "by a preponderance of the evidence, that the TAAS test was implemented in spite of the disparities or that the TAAS test has perpetuated
the disparities."'1 17 In other words, for the court, the background educational disparities were not properly part of the analysis of TAAS's disparate impact, any more than the history of exclusion of women in the
armed services was relevant to the constitutionality of the veterans' preference in Feeney.
GI Forum's causal standard is not, of course, as stringent as the one
that operates in Feeney, which rejects even proof that the action was
adopted "in spite of' its harm.' 1 8 But as in Feeney, the court searches,
even in the disparate impact context, for some conscious awareness by
the State that the testing policy would worsen the plight of minority students. As in Feeney and Davis, the court is concerned with limiting state
responsibility. Under Title VI disparate impact doctrine, Texas might be
held responsible for the development of an educationally invalid test, the
court's reasoning suggests, but not necessarily for the unequal educational conditions of minority students. 119 As the court puts the point:
"This case is . . . not directly about the history of minority education in
the State .... [T] hat history has. .. some bearing ...[but] what is really
t 20
at issue here is whether the TAAS exit-level test is fair."
While traditional disparate impact analysis is concerned primarily
with fairness as the lack of arbitrariness (in this case of the high school
graduation tests), plaintiffs' case implicitly is concerned with the way in
which testing policies might exacerbate racial inequality in education and
potential government indifference to high minority failure rates-the
possibility that high minority failure rates might fail to prompt government action to correct racial disparities. The burden shifting of disparate
impact can be useful in providing a check on disparity-producing action-such as by discouraging the adoption of an educationally invalid
test-but only to a point. GIForum stands as an example of how the questions posed by the Griggs disparate impact regime prove inadequate in
dealing with policies and practices that cause disparate racial impacts not
simply because they are arbitrary (as in the case of an invalid test), but
due to the interaction of these practices with structural and embedded

117. Id. at 670.
118. See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
119. This is despite the court's acknowledgement that the state bears responsibility for
some of these inequities. GI Forum, 87 F. Supp. 2d at 670.
120. Id.
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racial inequalities. 2 1 The language of GIForum, in particular its emphasis limiting government's responsibility for remedying the condition of
racial inequality, makes the case particularly illustrative of the limits of
Title VI's disparate impact theory, but the1 22paucity of successful Title VI
disparate impact cases also bears this out.
Title VI's breadth may have made the absence of a theory of disparate impact more troubling for courts. The power of Tide VI from a civil
rights plaintiffs perspective derives from the statute's application to a
large number of entities that receive federal funds and also to a broad
range of programs and activities. Most federal agencies adopted a Title
VI disparate impact rule, but they all adopted a broad prohibitory rule
with little elaboration of what sorts of disparate impacts are unjustified in,
12 3
for instance, transportation programs or in welfare programs and why.
If one goal is to encourage public institutions to address more complex forms of racial inequality, we are left with an unsatisfying account of
the power of the disparate impact standard to effectuate this goal. Yet,
there are in fact other regulatory approaches, which can be characterized
as a species of disparate impact theory, that may bring us closer to that
goal. In the next section, I examine the federal requirement that states
take steps to reduce the disproportionate confinement of minority
juveniles as an example of a mechanism that prompts questions not simply about the boundaries of institutional responsibility for a particular
problem, but the way in which specific public policies and practices might
serve to perpetuate racial inequities. The juvenile justice provision is concerned not with whether government actors can justify a policy based on
a goal or value unrelated to race, but the extent to which government
practices contribute to racial disparity and what actions can be taken to
counter this disparity. This approach is not entirely untethered to traditional notions of intentional discrimination, but it is potentially more responsive to bias that is not explicit, and to the problem of embedded and
cumulative patterns of racial inequality. One virtue of the regime, as discussed below, is that it operates not simply by prohibiting unspecified
disparate impacts, but by requiring state recipients of federal funds to
understand how racial disparity is generated in the juvenile justice system
and then to develop appropriate remedies.
III. BEYOND GRIGGS-BASED DISPARATE IMPACT
In 1992, Congress quietly amended the federal Juvenile Justice and
Delinquency Prevention Act to make, as a core requirement of the Act,
121. Stronger administrative enforcement of Title VI disparate impact rules might
provide greater incentives for recipients of federal funds to consider the racial impact of
their programmatic practices. See infra note 175.
122. See Abernathy, Legal Realism, supra note 81, at 294-312 (reviewing Tide VI
disparate impact cases and finding few successful lower court cases).
123. Some federal agencies have attempted to develop more specific guidance. See
infra note 175.
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recipients of federal aid take efforts to reduce the disproportionate confinement of minority juveniles. 124 The relative ease with which Congress
managed this change contrasts sharply with the controversy attending its
codification of the disparate impact standard in Title VII, a year earlier,
after a two-year battle over whether the standard would force employers
to adopt quotas. 12 5 In 2002, Congress extended the Act to require that
recipients of federal aid make efforts to reduce the disproportionate
number of minority juveniles who come into contact with the juvenile system. 126 This standard applies only to state-run juvenile justice programs
that receive federal funds and it contains no explicit private right of action. Yet the standard that the Act puts in place is potentially far-reaching
in that it requires public actors to generate information about and attempt to understand how racial disparities are produced, and is not limited to those disparities for which a court applying Title VI disparate impact analysis, for instance, might find a public actor responsible.
A. The Problem of Racial Disparity in Juvenile Justice
The problem of racial disparity in the juvenile justice system can be
seen as a typical example of the complexity of modem day racial inequality: A significant disparity exists in the involvement of African American
youth in the juvenile justice system, yet the reasons for the disparity are
more complicated than one might first assume. One piece of data is
clear: African American juveniles are overrepresented in juvenile justice
institutions as compared to their levels in the general population. 127
While about fifteen percent of all youth are African American, forty per124. Act of Nov. 4, 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-586, 106 Stat. 4982 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
125. More controversy surrounded the attempt in 1999 to reauthorize and extend the

DMC provision. Several prominent Republicans opposed reauthorization, claiming that
disparities were not linked to "discrimination" in the juvenile justice system but to higher
rates of crime commission by minorities, and that the bill would establish an
unconstitutional racial classification. See, e.g., 145 Cong. Rec. S5563 (1999) (statement of
Senator Hatch).
126. See 21st Century Department ofJustice Appropriations Authorization Act, Pub.
L. No. 107-273, 116 Stat. 1758 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 5633(a) (22) (2000)).
The Act requires that states develop a plan to "reduce, without establishing or requiring
numerical standards or quotas, the disproportionate number of juvenile members of

minority groups, who come into contact with the juvenile justice system." Id.
127. Some studies have also found that Latinos are overrepresented at various points
in the juvenile justice system, though there is substantially less research seeking to
understand this problem. For a recent study on Latino overrepresentation, see Francisco
A. Villarruel et al., D6nde estA La Justicia? A Call to Action on Behalf of Latino and
Latina Youth in the U.S. Justice System (2002), at http://www.buildingblocksforyouth.org/
latino.rpt/full-eng.html (on file with the ColumbiaLaw Review) (finding that Latino youth
are "significantly overrepresented in U.S. justice system and receive harsher treatment than
white youth even when charged with same offenses").
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cent of the juveniles confined in institutions are African American.1 28
Without further information, however, comparisons to general population statistics tell us little about the causes of the racial disparity. For
reasons that are not racial on their face-higher poverty rates, less access
to quality education, and fewer employment opportunities-African
American young people might be more likely to be involved in criminal
activity and to be arrested. 129 However, research shows that the overrepresentation of African American youth in juvenile institutions is not explained simply by racial differences in criminal activity, but by differential
treatment in the juvenile justice system itself.13 0 A given juvenile justice
case will involve multiple decision points: the initial delinquency referral
from police or other sources; the decision on whether to detain (which
can be made by intake staff, law enforcement officials, and the state's
attorneys); referral to prosecution for delinquency or for transfer to adult
court; and ajudicial disposition which may involve returning a child to a
community (for community service, informal, or formal probation), commitment to a residential facility, or transfer to adult court. A number of
studies have found that minority juveniles receive more severe dispositions at each of these stages ofjuvenile processing even when controlling
for relevant factors such as age, seriousness of the offense, and prior
records. 1 3 1 For instance, one study found that nonwhite youths referred
128. See Office ofJuvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, U.S. Dep't ofJustice,
Disproportionate Minority Confinement 2002 Update 3 (2004) [hereinafter DMC 2002
Update].
129. In 2003, the arrest rate for African American youth was more than 1.5 times the
arrest rate of white youth. See Office ofJuvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, U.S.
Dep't ofJustice, Juvenile Arrest Rates by Offense, Sex, and Race (1980-2004), available at
http://ojjdp.ncjrs.org/ojstatbb/crime (last visited Oct. 18, 2006) (on file with the Columbia
Law Review). The arrest rate of African American youth has decreased by almost sixty
percent since 1995. See id. The overrepresentation of minority youth in secure juvenile
detention and secure correctional facilities decreased slightly between 1995 and 1997. See
DMC 2002 Update, supra note 128, at 1 (citing most recent data).
130. See, e.g., Barry C. Feld, The Social Context of Juvenile Justice Administration:
Racial Disparities in an Urban Juvenile Court, in Minorities in Juvenile Justice 66, 93
(Kimberly Kempf Leonard et al. eds., 1995) (finding disparities at different points
throughout a Minnesota county's juvenile justice system when controlling for present
offense and prior records); Kimberly Kempf Leonard & Henry Sontheimer, The Role of
Race in juvenile justice in Pennsylvania, in Minorities in juvenile justice, supra, at 98, 119
(finding disparities in confinement when controlling for offense characteristics and prior
record); Michael J. Leiber, Toward Clarification of the Concept of "Minority" Status and
Decision-Making in juvenile Court Proceedings, 18J. Crime &Just. 79, 97 (1995) (finding
racial disparities in intake, petition, and severity of disposition in four counties in Iowa).
One commentator notes that two-thirds of studies on racial disparity in juvenile justice
identify race as a factor, while one-third find that race has no effect. See DarleneJ. Conley,
Adding Color to a Black and White Picture: Using Qualitative Data to Explain Racial
Disproportionality in the Juvenile Justice System, 31 J. Res. Crime & Delinq. 135, 135-36
(1994) (stating that majority of research has shown "race makes a difference").
131. See, e.g., Donna M. Bishop & Charles E. Frazier, The Influence of Race in
JuvenileJustice Processing, 25J. Res. Crime & Delinq. 242, 258 (1988) (finding, in study of
large southern state, that blacks were more likely to be "referred to court, adjudicated
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for delinquent acts "are more likely than comparable white youths to be
recommended for petition to court, to be held in pre-adjudicatory detention, to be formally processed in juvenile court, and to receive the most
132
formal or the most restrictive judicial dispositions."
The explanations for these racial disparities are complex. Some
qualitative studies suggest that what we typically understand as bias plays a
role. A study by George Bridges and Sara Steen of why African American
youths received harsher sentencing recommendations than their white
counterparts found that juvenile probation officers were more likely to
characterize crimes by minority youth as caused by "internal forces," such
as personal failure or weak moral character, and more likely to see crimes
by white youth as caused by "external forces," such as poor home life and
133
inadequate role models.
Racial disparities are also related to race in ways that are not simply
suggestive of subjective bias, but rather are linked to what some researchers call "indirect" race effects-the consideration by juvenile justice decisionmakers of factors that are race-related.1 3 4 Minority youth might be
treated differently because of characteristics that are unrelated to the ofdelinquent, and given harsher dispositions than comparable white offenders"); Donna M.
Bishop & Charles E. Frazier, Race Effects in Juvenile Justice Decision-Making: Findings of
a Statewide Analysis, 86J. Crim. L. & Criminology 392, 412-13 (1996) [hereinafter Bishop
& Frazier, Race Effects] (finding "clear indications of race differentials in justice
processing"); James B. Johnson & Philip E. Secret, Race and Juvenile Court Decision
Making Revisited, 4 Crim. Just. Pol'y Rev. 159, 167-71 (1990) (finding that African
American youth receive harsher dispositions at detention, petition, and penalty stages).
There are also some studies either of particular decisionmaking points in the juvenile
system, or of multiple decision points, that found limited or no racial disparities in the
jurisdictions studied after controlling for relevant factors. See, e.g., Jeffrey Fagan &
Elizabeth Piper Deschenes, Determinants ofJudicial Waiver Decisions for ViolentJuvenile
Offenders, 81 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 314, 336-37, 342, 346-47 (1990) (finding bias did
not explain racial disparities in decisions to waive violent juvenile offenders to adult
criminal court in Boston, Detroit, Newark, and Phoenix, and that waiver decisions were
made "inconsistent ly]"); Feld, supra note 130, at 75-94 (finding only limited race effects);
Bohsiu Wu et al., Assessing the Effects of Race and Class on Juvenile Justice Processing in
Ohio, 25 J. Crim. Just. 265, 271-74 (1997) (studying thirteen Ohio counties and finding
that African American youth were more likely to be detained but white youth were more
likely to be adjudicated, and that there were no racial disparities in ultimate disposition);
Joan Petersilia, Racial Disparities in the Criminal Justice System: A Summary, 31 Crime &
Delinq. 15, 19-21 (1985) (finding disparities caused by higher involvement by youth of
color in serious and violent crime and that African American youth were treated more
leniently at some stages of processing).
132. Bishop & Frazier, Race Effects, supra note 131, at 405-06. Bishop and Frazier's
study found that, on the other hand, whites received harsher dispositions than nonwhites
in status offense cases. Id. at 406.
133. See George S. Bridges & Sara Steen, Racial Disparities in Official Assessments of
Juvenile Offenders: Attributional Stereotypes as Mediating Mechanisms, 63 Am. Soc. Rev.
554, 562-64 (1998).
134. See, e.g., William H. Feyerherm, The DMC Initiative: The Convergence of Policy
and Research Themes, in Minorities in Juvenile Justice, supra note 130, at 1, 11
[hereinafter Feyerherm, DMC Initiative].
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fense level or prior history but are still related to race, such as family
characteristics or availability of community resources. Juvenile justice
decisionmakers may be more likely to detain a youth from a single-parent
family who they perceive as having poor family supports. A state might
decide to make youths ineligible for diversion programs (which allow delinquent children to avoid residential placement) when their family cannot be contacted, are not present for an intake interview, or are considered uncooperative by intake staff. 13 5 For race-dependent reasons, an
African American family may be more likely to be employed in a low-wage
sector and less able to take time from their job; more likely to be composed of a single parent, and thus have fewer childcare and family supports; and less likely to have access to the transportation resources necessary to make visits or participate in counseling. 136 Juvenile justice officials
may also perceive African American families, who are more likely to be
poor and more likely to be from single-parent families, as less able to
provide adequate supervision and support to delinquent youth. 1 3 7 While
consideration of family supports may be justified to ensure success of a
diversion program, placing great weight on these factors may contribute
to racial disparities in the decision to detain that are unrelated to prior
record or offense characteristics.
In addition, African Americans have less access to private, retained
counsel that sometimes provide superior representation. 138 Because of
higher poverty rates and less access to comprehensive health insurance,
African Americans have less access to private treatment options-such as
psychological counseling and drug treatment-that allow a child to avoid
commitment to residential facilities.13 9 Additionally, what one researcher
calls 'justice by geography" is often at play: A state's minority youth pop135. See Bishop & Frazier, Race Effects, supra note 131, at 407-08 (describing
procedure in Florida).
136. See id. at 407. The study recounts the view of an intake supervisor:
Our manual told us to interview the child and the parent prior to making a
recommendation to the state's attorney. We are less able to reach poor and
minority clients. They are less responsive to attempts to reach them. They don't
show. They don't have transportation. Then they are more likely to be
recommended for formal processing. Without access to a client's family, the less
severe options are closed. Once it gets to court, the case is likely to be
adjudicated because it got there. It's a self fulfilling prophecy.
Id. at 407-08.
137. See id. at 409. Such findings lead Bishop and Frazier to discount prejudicial
attitude or individual bias as a contributing factor, and instead see "institutional racism" as
the cause of racial disparities in delinquency processing. See id. at 412.
138. See Justice Cut Short: An Assessment of Access to Counsel and Quality of
Representation in Delinquency Proceedings in Ohio 25-29 (Kim Brooks et al. eds., 1995)
(finding racial disparities in access to counsel in Ohio); Bishop & Frazier, Race Effects,
supra note 131, at 408; Jolanta Juszkiewicz, Youth Crime/Adult Time: Is Justice Served?,
available at http://buildingblocksfotyouth.org./ycat/ycat.html (last visited Nov. 15, 2006)
(on file with the Columbia Law Review) (finding white youth twice as likely as African
American youth to retain private counsel).
139. See Bishop & Frazier, Race Effects, supra note 131, at 408.
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ulation may be concentrated (because of residential segregation and
other factors) in communities with fewer prevention and diversion
40
resources.'
Similarly, evidence shows that a major contributing factor to racial
disparity in the juvenile justice system is that African American youth are
more likely to come into contact with that system. In part, this is a function of the way in which minority communities are policed, and the way
in which police respond to young minority men in particular. For instance, one study of racial disparity in Georgia's juvenile justice system
found that African American youth received more severe dispositions because they tend to have more prior police contacts than their white counterparts. 14 1 The study's authors explicitly leave open the question of
whether disparities in police contacts are the result of race discrimination, noting that the "fact that law enforcement officials have considerable discretion in the determination of how many and what types of
charges to place against an alleged offender complicates the interpretation of [the gross racial disparities in Georgia's juvenile justice system] .,142 Another qualitative study suggests that the way in which minority communities and individuals are policed affects the likelihood that a
juvenile will come into contact with police, and also how a juvenile of
color's actions and behaviors are recorded by the police. 1 43 Evidence
suggests that the war on drugs in particular led to great increases in the
confinement of minority youth because it concentrated police attention
in communities with high per capita rates of drug dealing (and often
associated levels of violence) while paying less attention to drug use and
144
trafficking in nonminority communities.
140. See Feyerherm, DMC Initiative, supra note 134, at 11.
141. See Office ofJuvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, U.S. Dep't ofJustice,
Minorities and the Juvenile Justice System 14-15 (1995), available at http://
www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles/minor.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (citing L.L.
Lockhart et al., Georgia's Juvenile Justice System: A Retrospective Investigation of Racial
Disparity (1990)).
142. Id. at 15 (citing L.L. Lockhart et al., Georgia's Juvenile Justice System: A
Retrospective Investigation of Racial Disparity 10 (1990)).
143. Darlene Conley's quantitative and qualitative study of racial disparity in a western
state examines the effect of police interaction in producing racial disparity. See Conley,
supra note 130, at 137. Her research shows that African American and Hispanic youths
came into frequent contact with police patrolling their neighborhoods for drug activity,
were subject to surveillance in predominantly white communities (such as shopping malls),
and were frequently stopped when driving in cars. Id. at 141-42. Her study also suggests
that because of police and community attention to the problem of gang violence, African
American and Hispanic youth were more likely to be labeled as gang members at the point
of arrest. See id. at 144; see alsoJeffrey Fagan et al., Blind Justice? The Impact of Race on
the Juvenile Justice Process, 33 Crime & Delinq. 224, 235-38 (1987) (reporting research
results that police decisions on how to respond to youthful offenders are affected by race
of youth).
144. See Feyerherm, DMC Initiative, supra note 134, at 11 (citing research that war on
drugs increased confinement of minority youths "despite evidence that drug use and
trafficking is not primarily a minority behavior"); Howard N. Snyder, Growth in Minority

2007]

DISPARITY RULES

Understanding how overrepresentation occurs in juvenile justice requires understanding both the actions of the prosecutors and judges and
how they treat racial minorities when all other things are equal-what the
law might understand as an unjustified disparate impact. Yet another dimension involves how the practices of the juvenile justice system interact
with the race-based actions of other institutions, and understanding how
deeply race is embedded in all the institutions-that is, the police, the
community-based organizations, the family structure-with which the juvenile justice system interacts. The race effects caused by other actors
(the police) might be considered to fall outside a typical disparate impact
analysis, because they are not seen as caused by the juvenile justice
system.
B. The DMC Regime
The problem of disproportionate confinement of minority youth
came to national attention as the result of the National Coalition of State
JuvenileJustice Advisory Groups' 1988 annual report to Congress entitled
A Delicate Balance.145 The Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention
Act (JJDPA) authorizes the creation ofjuvenile justice advisory groups in
each state and the District of Columbia to provide assistance to each state
in meeting the core requirements of the JJDPA and administering federal
funds. In 1984, the state advisory groups formed the national organization, now called the Coalition of Juvenile Justice. The 1988 report
presented findings that minority youth were overrepresented at every
stage of the juvenile justice system compared to their numbers in the general population-including a minority incarceration rate three to four
times greater than the white incarceration rate-and that higher rates of
minority involvement in more serious crimes did not fully explain the
disparity. 14 6 The report added to concerns expressed by members of
Congress as early as 1986 and by experts testifying before Congress during hearings leading to the 1988 reauthorization of the federal juvenile
147
justice act.
As a response to concerns about overrepresentation of minorities in
the juvenile justice system, Congress in its 1988 amendments to theJJDPA
required states to develop yearly plans to "reduce the proportion of
Detention Attributed to Drug Law Violators, OJJDP Update on Stat. (Dep't of Justice,
Wash., D.C.), Mar. 1990, at 1, 6 (stating that war on drugs was "major factor[ ] in the
substantial increase in the number of nonwhite youth detained by the juvenile courts").
145. Nat'l Coal. of State Juvenile Justice Advisory Groups, A Delicate Balance (1989).
146. See id. at 5-6 (explaining that higher minority arrest rates do not alone account
for minority overrepresentation in correctional facilities); id. at 8 (citing data showing
racial disparity in decisionmaking in juvenile justice system when controlling for offense
severity).
147. See Feyerherm, DMC Initiative, supra note 134, at 8-9. Feyerherm recounts
testimony in 1986 and 1987 from advocates at the National Council on Crime and
Delinquency and from the Center for the Study of Youth Policy on the increasing rates of
minority incarceration in Minnesota.

COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 107:374

juveniles detained or confined in secure detention facilities, secure correctional facilities, jails, and lockups who are members of minority groups
if such proportion exceeds the proportion such groups represent in the
general population." 148 Between 1988 and 1991, the federal Office of
Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention (OJJDP) provided technical
assistance to states, largely through the publication of guides and manuals. 1 49 In 1991, OJJDP funded five competitively selected states to develop model programs for reducing disparities in confinement and to as150
sess the successes of these programs.
In 1992 Congress again amended the JJDPA to make reducing disproportionate minority confinement a "core" requirement of the Act,
meaning that states must make good faith efforts toward addressing disparities or risk losing up to twenty-five percent of their federal funding. 151
To that point, the core requirements of the JJDPA-the result of decades
of advocacy by juvenile justice providers and child advocacy organizations-were the separation of juvenile offenders from adults in institutions, the deinstitutionalization of status offenders (e.g., runaways and
other children in need of supervision who have not committed delinquent acts), and the removal of juvenile offenders from adult jails and
institutions. JJDPA requires that all of a state's "formula" funds-block
grants-be directed to these core requirements until compliance is
achieved. The 1992 amendments, in making the reduction of disparities
in confinement a "core" requirement, tied twenty-five percent of a state's
formula grant funds to meeting the DMC requirement.
In 2002, Congress changed the requirement for reducing disparity
from disproportionate minority confinement to disproportionate minority contact, requiring that possible disproportionate effects be examined at
all decision points in the juvenile justice continuum. The Act requires
that to receive federal funding states must develop plans to "address juvenile delinquency prevention efforts and system improvement efforts designed to reduce, without establishing or requiring numerical standards
or quotas, the disproportionate number ofjuvenile members of minority
groups who come into contact with the juvenile justice system."1 52

148. Heidi Hsia, Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, Dep't of
Justice, A Disproportionate Minority Contact (DMC) Chronology: 1988 to Date, available
at http://ojjdp.ncjrs.gov/dmc/about/chronology.html (last visited Nov. 16, 2006)
[hereinafter Disproportionate Minority Contact] (on file with the Columbia Law Review);
see Pub. L. No. 100-690, 102 Stat. 4181 (1988).
149. See Disproportionate Minority Contact, supra note 148.
150. See Heidi M. Hsia & Donna Hamparian, U.S. Dep't ofJustice, Disproportionate
Minority Confinement 1997 Update 2 (1998).
151. See Act of Nov. 4, 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-586, 106 Stat. 4982 (codified in scattered
sections of 42 U.S.C.).
152. See 42 U.S.C. § 5633(a) (22) (2000).
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States must first identify whether disproportionate minority confinement is a problem in their state.1 53 Second, states must assess the cause
of disproportionate minority confinement, by, at a minimum, identifying
and explaining differences at various points in the juvenile justice system
(such as arrest, diversion, adjudication, and court disposition). 154 States
in which racial and ethnic disparities in confinement are a problem must
develop an intervention plan. Federal regulations give states broad discretion in developing the plan, though it must address certain specified
areas, such as increasing the availability and quality of juvenile diversion
programs, improving the capacity of prevention programs in minority
155
communities, and providing training to staff.
Under the DMC model, the federal government through OJJDP provides ongoing funding for DMC as part of the Formula Grants programs,
and special funding for DMC projects in particular states. OJJDP, in partnership with contractors and grantees, provides technical assistance and
training to states and disseminates research on effective strategies to reduce DMC.1 5 6 Advocates disseminate information on model programs,
conduct trainings, issue reports highlighting problems, and press states to
adopt reform practices. While the DMC standard is fairly open-ended,
the back and forth between states, policymakers, and advocates allows for
guidance.
At the federal level, OJJDP provides technical assistance to explore
the causes of and solutions to racial disparity in confinement. This assistance has included collecting research on the problem of racial disparity
in the juvenile justice system; cataloging innovative state efforts to address
the problem; and publishing assessments on model programs. Over the
years, Congress has also provided states with funding to develop some of

153. See 28 C.F.R. § 31.303(j)(1) (2006). OJJDP provides guidelines for calculating
disproportionate minority confinement. See id. Initially, OJJDP required that states
calculate disproportionate confinement by comparing minority youth as a percentage of
confined youth to the minority youth as a percentage of the total population. Under the
new system, known as the relative rate index, a state determines disparity by comparing the
rate of confinement of white youth to the rate of confinement of the particular minority
group. The rate ratio method is considered better because it develops a measurement that
is unaffected by the relative proportion of minorities in the total youth population, and
permits comparison of more than one ethnic group. See William H. Feyerherm &Jeffrey
Butts, Proposed Methods for Measuring Disproportionate Minority Contact, available at
http://ojjdp.ncjrs.org/dmc/pdf/dmc2003.pps (last visited Jan. 25, 2007) (on file with the
Columbia Law Review); see also OJJDP, Dep't of Justice, Implementing the Relative Rate
Index Calculation: A Step-by-Step Approach to Identifying Disproportionate Minority
Confinement Within the Juvenile Justice System, available at http://ojjdp.ncjrs.org/dmc/
pdf/StepsinCalculatingtheRelativeRatelndex.pdf (last visited Jan. 25, 2007) (on file with
the Columbia Law Review) (providing "step by step instructions for completing the initial
identification stage for examining Disproportionate Minority Contact").
154. See 28 C.F.R. § 31.303() (2).
155. See id. § 31.303(j) (3) (i)-(v).
156. See DMC 2002 Update, supra note 128, at 5-7.
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C. Informing Disparity
While it cannot yet be said that nationwide racial disparities in juvenile justice have been substantially reduced, the federal DMC requirement has encouraged states to assess the extent and causes of racial disparity;157 resulted in the development of promising programs and
initiatives some of which have reduced racial disparities in particular
states; 158 and provided a focal point for advocacy for system improvements by private providers and outside advocacy organizations.1 5 9 Assessments of the success of the DMC initiative nationally and its success in
particular states are underway.1 60 What is so far clear is that the DMC
regime creates incentives both to generate information regarding causes
of racial disparity and to develop solutions-incentives that differ substantially from the statutory disparate impact regimes in several promising ways.
157. See, e.g., Feyerherm, DMC Initiative, supra note 134, at 12-13, 15 (noting
"explosion of data surrounding the DMC issue" since 1986). But see DMC 2002 Update,
supra note 128, at 16 (noting that in 2002 at least eighteen states had yet to identify factors
contributing to racial disparities in juvenile justice due to uncompleted "quality
assessment[s]").
158. See Eleanor H. Hoytt et al., Reducing Racial Disparities in Juvenile Detention
46-52, 54-64 (2004), available at http://www.aecf.org/publications/data/8_reducing.pdf
(on file with the Columbia Law Review) (describing successes in Santa Cruz, California and
Multnomah County, Oregon); DMC 2002 Update, supra note 128, at 13-15 (describing
state efforts to address racial disparity by funding community-based intervention programs,
exploring alternatives to detention, providing diversity training to staff, and developing
standardized screening instruments to encourage objective decisionmaking). For
example, the W. Haywood Burns Center, based in California, has been working with state
administrators to reduce racial disparity in ten sites across the country. Telephone
Interview with Michael Harris, Deputy Dir., The W. Haywood Burns Inst. for Juvenile
Justice Fairness & Equity, in New York, N.Y. (Oct. 26, 2005).
159. For instance, in 1998, the Youth Law Center formed the Building Blocks for
Youth Initiative (with support from OJJDP) in collaboration with other nongovernmental
organizations including the American Bar Association. The Building Blocks Initiative
conducts research on minority overrepresentation in juvenile justice, promotes
understanding of model interventions, and directs advocacy for minority youth in the
justice system (OJJDP funds do not support this latter activity). See DMC 2002 Update,
supra note 128, at 7-8 (describing Building Blocks initiative). Advocates have also sought
to hold states accountable for failure to adequately address identified disparities. For
instance, in May 2003, the ACLU published a report faulting Massachusetts for failing to
implement plans to reduce juvenile disparity, properly spend allocated money on
programs to reduce racial disparity, or conduct adequate research to identify the causes of
racial disparity. See ACLU, Disproportionate Minority Confinement in Massachusetts:
Failures in Assessing and Addressing Overrepresentation of Minorities in the
Massachusetts Juvenile Justice System (2003), available at http://www.aclu.org/FilesPDFs/
dmc.report.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
160. See, e.g., Hoytt et al., supra note 158, at 8-9 (analyzing success of DMC in five
states).
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First, the DMC model is designed to analyze how racial disparities
arise and develop solutions stemming from those analyses. The inquiry
under DMC begins not simply with an analysis of the reasonableness of
the institutional practices of government-the inquiry under Title VI disparate impact-but consists of attempting to understand the multiple
causes of racial disparity and the extent to which decisions by public actors might contribute to disparities in minority involvement with the juvenile justice system. In developing the DMC mandate, Congress was explicitly responding to research on the increasing levels of confinement of
minority youth, and specifically to evidence that the racial disparity was
not caused simply by higher levels of delinquency among minority
youth. 161 The congressional and public discourse on disparities in juvenile justice recognized that higher rates of incarceration were not explained solely by higher rates of minority crime.162 By providing data and
at least some amount of empirical evidence on the causes of disparity,
these studies on DMC can be seen as unsettling Loury's notion of racial
indifference because they confront the implicit assumption that racial dis1 63
parities are something to be expected or part of the natural course.
That these studies reveal patterns suggestive of disparate treatment is
noteworthy as well; although the DMC remedy addresses issues beyond
disparate treatment, evidence suggestive of systemic bias might have provided additional political incentives to devise a remedy. Information generation is also a constitutive part of the remedy. 164 To address disparity
under the DMC model means to identify, assess, and examine the extent
and causes of this disparity at every decision point in the juvenile justice
system. A singular solution is not prescribed. This can be a potential
weakness by providing states insufficient direction. 165 But allowing states
some flexibility is responsive to the reality that the solution will differ
depending on the causes of the disparity and the particular context, and
161. See Feyerherm, DMC Initiative, supra note 134, at 7-8.
162. Id. at 9-10.
163. Cf. Ayres, Pervasive Prejudice, supra note 43, at 396 (arguing that government
should play greater role in providing empirical information about extent and causes of
disparate treatment in consumer and other markets).
164. As ajudge involved with Oregon's efforts to reduce racial disparity put it, "once
we had real data, we were able to move from anecdotal information to data-based
strategies, because now we knew how real the problem was." Hoytt et al., supra note 158, at
56 (citation omitted).
165. OJDP's initial instructions provided states discretion "because of the belief that
the resources and data needed to ascertain the extent of DMC, determine the cause(s),
and address the problem could vary by jurisdiction." Michael J. Lieber, Disproportionate
Minority Confinement (DMC) of Youth: An Analysis of State and Federal Efforts to
Address the Issue, 48 Crime & Delinq. 3, 16 (2002) (citation omitted). Lieber also argues
that the DMC standard was kept vague in order to diffuse state resistance to the mandate.
See id. Lieber finds that initial enforcement of DMC was hampered by the fact that many
states did not know how to conduct disparity assessment studies, though he also notes that
OJJDP has subsequently worked to provide more specific technical assistance to states on
how to collect and analyze data. See id. at 17-19.
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that the solution might be informed by model programs from other states
and localities, and the insights of government, researchers, and nongovernmental organizations. 16 6 Solutions to the problem of racial disparity
stem from ongoing study and assessment of successful interventions by
1 67
federal, state, and private actors.
Second, in contrast to the concern that both the constitutional standard and Title VI's disparate impact standard will limit public agency responsibility for underlying racial inequality, the DMC regime requires
public agencies to assess how their decisions might contribute to disparity
even where the agency is not responsible for the underlying condition.
Thus, a detention screening instrument might consider factors such as
family structure or school involvement in deciding whether to detain.
These factors might be considered reasonable in a Title VI disparate impact case in that they might be indicative of recidivism or likelihood of
appearing in court. And any adverse impact in considering these factors
might be said to be caused not by these screening factors but by higher
rates of single-parenthood or lower rates of school involvement by minority youth. By contrast, in addressing DMC, a county in Oregon considered how criteria in its screening instruments such as "good family structure" might lead to disparities in minority communities with higher rates
of single-parent families. The county now asks "whether there is an adult
1 68
willing to be responsible for assuring the youth's appearance in court."
The county also decided that, instead of "school attendance," it would
consider "productive activity" which takes into account participation in
training or employment.' 69 In other words, public actors consider how
their practices interact with racial differences in family structure and
70
school attendance rates.1
In addition, because the DMC standard requires recipients of federal
money to assess and address the cause of disparity, the policies and practices of a full range of agencies-police, courts, as well as the human
services agency generally responsible for juvenile justice-are all at issue.
As a practical matter, securing cooperation of multiple agencies can
166. The dependence on research can also be a challenge. A 2002 OJJDP study
found that a number of states (eighteen) had not identified the factors contributing to
disparities in juvenile involvement because they lacked the resources or technical ability to
collect data and perform analysis. See DMC 2002 Update, supra note 128, at 16-17.
167. Feyerherm notes: "No quick universal fix nor any permanent fix appears
possible. This means that policy progress will require ongoing access and use of quality
information and analysis." Feyerherm, DMC Initiative, supra note 134, at 14.
168. Hoytt et al., supra note 158, at 57.
169. Id.
170. Jurisdictions might also, of course, credit all the disparity to socioeconomic
factors that are beyond their capacity to remedy. See Judith A. Cox & James Bell,
Addressing Disproportionate Representation of Youth of Color in the Juvenile Justice
System, 2001 J. Ctr. for Fams., Child. & Courts 31, 33-34 (describing how Santa Cruz
County originally characterized disparities as justifiable in terms of offense history and
presenting offenses, but then began examining their own policies, procedures, and
programs to consider how they contributed to racial disparities).
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thwart achievement of the DMC mandate.1 71 Yet plans adopted in some
states have addressed a broad range of practices across a variety of agencies. For instance, in response to the DMC mandate, Washington State
enacted legislation mandating the development of standards for prosecution ofjuvenile offenders, enhanced training ofjuvenile court personnel,
developed standardized risk assessment in all juvenile courts, and
adopted community- and school-based prevention programs in minority
communities. 172 Even examination of practices by a single agency can
play a substantial role in reducing DMC, by prompting juvenile justice
agencies to examine the way that the policies over which they have direct
control interact with the practices of other public agencies.1 73 In this
manner, the DMC standard evades the limitation of traditional disparate
impact remedies: It prompts institutional reform without consideration
of whether a disparity producing practice is 'Justified" by institutional necessity or "caused" by the juvenile justice system. The ideal of the DMC
regime is that it leads public institutions to assess how public practices
contribute to racial inequality, not for the purpose of allocating blame or
as a condition of intervention but rather to understand the nature of the
problem.
A final feature worth noting is that the DMC standard does not simply announce a broad prohibitory rule forbidding actions with a particular racial impact, but requires recipients of federal aid to take affirmative
steps to reduce the racial impact of their actions. This is not to say that
the DMC provides detailed rules on what states should do. Indeed as
noted above, the DMC rules leave much discretion to states on how to
reduce racial disparities, a potential virtue of the scheme. Yet, as evidenced in unsuccessful cases like GI Forum and even in the successful
cases like Labor/Community Strategy Center v. Los Angeles County Metropolitan
TransportationAuthority, part of the judicial resistance to Title VI's disparate impact standards occurs because Title VI applies to a wide set of
public activities with potentially broad redistributive effect. 17 4 Moreover,
171. See Hoytt et al., supra note 158, at 45 (documenting difficulties in including law
enforcement agencies in Sacramento).
172. DMC 2002 Update, supra note 128, at 21-24.
173. For instance the Santa Cruz Probation Department sought to address racial
disparities by increasing diversity in hiring and training to address bias, as well as by
changing institutional practices such as beginning weekend intake procedures, addressing
barriers to minority involvement in detention alternative programs, and developing
services in rural minority communities. See Hoytt et al., supra note 158, at 47-48. The
result was a twenty-five percent decrease in the average daily population of minority youth
who were detained. See id. at 50. Still, there is a danger that juvenile justice agencies
might pay insufficient attention to the impact of their own practices. An assessment by
OJJDP suggests that states are more likely to invest in delinquency and intervention
programs in minority communities than in system changes (e.g., increase in cultural
diversity and sensitivity among staff or changes in their screening instruments to allow
objective decisionmaking). See DMC 2002 Update, supra note 128, at 17.
174. See, e.g., Labor/Cmty. Strategy Ctr. v. L.A. County Metro. Transp. Auth., 263
F.3d 1041, 1043 (9th Cir. 2001).
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the regulations provide no serious guidance on what constitutes an unjustified racial impact in the context of a particular programmatic area, e.g.,
education, health, environment, or transportation. 175 The absence of
specific regulatory guidance along with limited administrative and judicial enforcement even in the pre-Sandoval era,1 76 might result in recipients who are unlikely to consider themselves to have an affirmative duty
to consider racial effects. 1 7 7 In the context of DMC, even as the federal
administrative agency continues to define how to analyze data and pro175. Some federal agencies have initiated some rulemaking to require funding
recipients to more affirmatively consider racial impact in the operation of their programs.
See 65 Fed. Reg. 39,650 (June 27, 2003) (providing guidance regarding environmental
permitting programs); Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000d-2000d-7
(2000); Policy Guidance on the Prohibition Against National Origin Discrimination as It
Affects Persons with Limited English Proficiency, 65 Fed. Reg. 52,762 (Aug. 30, 2000).
Greater agency enforcement of Title VI rules and clarification of the requirements of
disparate impact could provide incentives to consider impact much like those of the DMC
regime. See Note, After Sandoval: Judicial Challenges and Administrative Possibilities in
Title VI Enforcement, 116 Harv. L. Rev. 1774, 1789-93 (2003) (arguing that focus on
facilitating compliance will aid regulatory agencies in meeting heightened enforcement
obligations); see also Sara Rosenbaum &Joel Teitelbaum, Civil Rights Enforcement in the
Modern Healthcare System: Reinvigorating the Role of the Federal Government in the
Aftermath of Alexander v. Sandoval, 3 Yale J. Health Pol'y L. & Ethics 215, 233 (2003)
(explaining how increased Title VI enforcement in healthcare could help reduce racial
disparities in healthcare).
176. Outside the area of education, agency enforcement of Title VI, and of the
disparate impact regulations in particular, has been limited. See U.S. Comm'n on Civil
Rights, Federal Title VI Enforcement to Ensure Nondiscrimination in Federally Assisted
Programs 223-25 (1996), available at http://eric.ed.gov/ERICWebPortal/Home.portal
(on file with the Columbia Law Review) (finding that Department of Health and Human
Services (HHS) "has hardly developed its Title VI enforcement program since [HHS
became a separate department] in 1980" and that HHS Office of Civil Rights "lacked
individual civil rights policies, precedents, standards, and procedures necessary to operate
an effective civil rights enforcement program"); Luke W. Cole, Civil Rights, Environmental
Justice and the EPA: The Brief History of Administrative Complaints Under Title VI of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, 9J. Envtl. L. & Litig. 309, 392 (1994) (recounting that until August
1994, EPA had one staff person dealing with all civil rights complaints and lacked
procedural or substantive guidelines for responding to Title VI complaints); Rosenbaum &
Teitelbaum, supra note 175, at 230-33 (detailing lack of enforcement of Title VI by
Department of Health and Human Services).
177. A poignant example is Luke Cole's description of the reaction of Mississippi state
officials to a Title VI disparate impact challenge to the permitting of a waste facility in a
predominantly black community:
"We evaluate the project and make sure it's up to our standards, and we don't
look at the racial or economic makeup .... I don't know what's on their minds
when they decide where to locate a site .... The problem is, right now there are
no requirements that say we ought to consider the economic status of a
community or the racial status of a community in determining whether or not to
approve a permit for a facility . .. ."
Cole, supra note 176, at 346 (first omission in original) (quoting Charles Chisolm, Dir. of
Pollution Control, Miss. Dep't of Envtl. Quality); see also Rosenbaum & Teitelbaum, supra
note 175, at 234 ("[A]lthough Title VI compliance is a condition of federal funding, this
simple fact is not stated anywhere in federal regulations governing Medicare's conditions
of participation."); id. at 234-35 (finding that because of lack of clear requirements,
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vide technical assistance on model programs, the basic duty of states to
consider racial effects-and more specifically to assess racial disparities
and devise solutions-is clear.
None of this is to mask the limitations of the DMC approach. The
DMC statute affords no explicit private right of action for judicial enforcement, and the DMC requirement would be difficult to enforce using
§ 1983 under the Court's holding in Gonzaga University v. Doe.178 While
most states have taken initial steps to address the law's requirements, several states, according to OjjDP's analysis, have not complied with the
most basic requirements of the DMC mandate. 179 After years of inaction,
OJJDP has started to withhold funds from noncompliant states.180 Still, it
is likely that funds will only be withheld from states that fail to comply
with basic plan requirements, a fairly low threshold.
When DMC succeeds, however, it is unlikely to be the result of coercion by the federal government, but by its potential to empower internal
and external advocates concerned about the problem of racial disparity
in the juvenile justice system. Some states have gone far in excess of what
is required under the statute, either because of pressure by nongovernmental organizations or because internal advocates now have a hook to
spur reform. 8 1 Information production is a significant component of
the DMC regime. States are now required to produce data on disparities
in juvenile justice, and to report their programmatic efforts. With this
new transparency, the public now has access to information, as advocates
are able to publish data on levels of disparity, and compare juvenile justice systems across states.18 2 A consortium of juvenile justice organizations receive funding from national foundations as well as from OJJDP to
publicize the problem of disparities in juvenile justice and to disseminate
information on promising approaches to reducing disparity.18 3 Advofunding recipients repeatedly issue policies that are facially neutral "but are capable of
producing devastating racial effects").
178. See 536 U.S. 273, 283 (2002) (holding that § 1983 analysis of whether Congress
intended to create an enforceable right is no different than in implied right of action
cases).

179. See, e.g., DMC 2002 Update, supra note 128, at 10-11.
180. Telephone Interview with Heidi Hsia, DMC Coordinator, Office of Juvenile
Justice & Delinquency Prevention, Dep't of Justice, in New York, N.Y. (Oct. 27, 2005).
181. Telephone Interview with Michael Harris, supra note 158.
182. See, e.g., W. Haywood Burns Inst. for Juvenile Justice Fairness & Equity, State
Disproportionate Minority Confinement Data, at http://www.burnsinstitute.org/dmc (last
visited Oct. 18, 2006) (on file with the Columbia Law Review). Scholars have written about
the role of public information in institutional reform in other public law contexts. See,
e.g., Bradley Karkkainen, Information as Environmental Regulation: TRI and
Performance Benchmarking, Precursor to a New Paradigm?, 89 Geo. L.J. 257, 295-300
(2001) (describing successes of EPA program requiring firms to publicly report toxic
emissions). The effect is likely to be smaller in the DMC context, as racial disparities in
juvenile justice are less likely to generate the level of public outcry generated by toxic
waste, for instance.
183. This consortium is known as the Building Blocks for Youth Initiative. See supra
note 159.
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cates are also conducting nonlitigation advocacy to ensure enforcement,
producing reports on states that are not taking sufficient steps to comply
with the mandate, and applying political pressure to increase state compliance and boost oversight at the national level. 184 The production of
information also provides concrete data to internal reformers to help
guide their policymaking, and makes available a pool of information
about effective or promising programmatic developments from other
jurisdictions.
This is not to deny that the DMC regime might be more effective
with stronger enforcement and accountability measures, such as the conditioning of federal funding on state progress in reducing racial disparities in particular areas, or providing bonuses to states that have made
progress. The DMC standard's flexibility helps federal and state governments develop expertise on the causes of racial disparity in juvenile justice and on effective solutions. The statute, however, would be stronger if
it included greater accountability measures as governments gain more
concrete information about specific, promising approaches. 8 5
IV.

IMPLICATIONS

DMC points to regulatory innovation in addressing racial disparities,
not yet acknowledged in the legal commentary, that moves beyond the
limitations of traditional impact theory. The DMC regime responds to
the problem of public indifference to racial disparities by requiring that
states become conscious of racial harm. It seeks to interrupt what some
commentators have called the "[r]outine, [o]rdinary [g]eneration of
[i]nequality" by institutions in intentionally or unintentionally producing
racial inequality over time. 186 The DMC framework meets the complexity
of the problem of racial disparity by aiming at racial inequality caused by
bias (unintentional or intentional), but also at the way in which government practices interact with race-specific structures of opportunity.
This final Part turns to the portability of the DMC approach to other
problems of racial inequality, the existence of this model outside the domain of judicial enforcement, and the normative implications of using
racial disparity-as opposed to racial discrimination-as a trigger for social intervention.
184. See, e.g., ACLU, supra note 159 (documenting and publicizing Massachusetts's
failure to comply with DMC mandate).
185. The literature on experimentalist regimes has detailed how to use benchmarks
and "rolling rules" as a way of incorporating learning from better performing entities. See,
e.g., Brandon L. Garrett &James S. Liebman, Experimentalist Equal Protection, 22 Yale L.
& Pol'y Rev. 261, 291-92 (2004) (describing use of performance benchmarking and
experimintation in education reform); Charles F. Sabel & William Simon, Destabilization
Rights: How Public Law Litigation Succeeds, 117 Harv. L. Rev. 1015, 1069-70 (2004)
(describing judicial remedies in public law litigation that take form of provisional, rolling
rules which are revised to respond to new information and contingencies).
186. Brown et al., supra note 17, at 19.
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A. EmergingModel?
DMC is not the only area where legislation has been developed to
address racial disparities by requiring public agencies to collect data,
make the data more publicly available, and monitor the extent and cause
of racial disparities. At the federal level, the No Child Left Behind Act
(NCLB), though controversial for its reliance on tests and its imposition
of federal mandates on states, i8 7 like DMC requires that states report
achievement data according to race and ethnicity, and take steps to reduce racial disparities in test scores and other indicia of achievement
(such as high school completion rates).188 An animating concept behind
the legislation was that requiring states to report data and measure yearly
progress for racial and ethnic subgroups would smoke out differences in
educational attainment by race that had been obscured by aggregating
data on statewide achievement, resulting in targeted interventions to underachieving groups of children.' 8 9 Some commentators and nongovernmental organizations have urged the use of this data as a focal point
for advocacy and information sharing about best practices. 190 To be sure,
187. Commentators disagree on whether NCLB unduly emphasizes rote testing and
intrudes on state authority. Compare Garrett & Liebman, supra note 185, at 311 (arguing
that these criticisms "misunderstand[ ] the experimentalist nature of the remedy-the
NCLB rejects inflexible testing goals imposed from above and instead asks that states set
their own achievement and progress goals and standards"), with Gail L. Sunderman &
Jimmy Kim, Expansion of Federal Power in American Education: Federal-State
Relationships Under the No Child Left Behind Act, Year One, at 17 (2004), at http://
www.civilrightsproject.harvard.edu/research/esea/Federal-report.pdf (on file with the
Columbia Law Review) [hereinafter Sunderman & Kim, Expansion of Federal Power]
(finding, among other things, that NCLB expands testing requirements, mandates which
subjects are to be tested, and establishes timelines for those assessments).
188. Pub. L. No. 107-110, 115 Stat. 1425 (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. § 6301
note (Supp. II 2002)). NCLB is the name of the 2001 Act reauthorizing Title 1 of the
Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA), which, among other things, provides
funds to states for educating low-income students. NCLB builds on state accountability
systems, such as those in Kentucky, North Carolina, and Texas, that measure educational
outcomes, set goals, and attempt to improve educational practices. See Garrett &
Liebman, supra note 185, at 309-10. As discussed earlier, see supra text accompanying
notes 100-121, the plaintiffs GI Forum challenged portions of that system, though, it
should be noted, they challenged not the use of tests to hold schools and districts
accountable, but the use of tests in making promotion and graduation decisions for
individual students. The federal NCLB, while allowing states to set achievement goals
using standardized tests, does not mandate the use of tests in making high-stakes
educational decisions for children.
189. See 20 U.S.C. § 6301 (2000) (describing Act, in Statement of Purpose, as aimed
at "[cilosing the achievement gap between high and low-performing children, especially
the achievement gaps between minority and nonminority students, and between
disadvantaged children and their more advantaged peers"); Garrett & Liebman, supra
note 185, at 314.
190. See DanielJ. Losen, Challenging Racial Disparities: The Promise and Pitfalls of
the No Child Left Behind Act's Race-Conscious Accountability, 47 How. L.J. 243, 295-96
(suggesting how civil rights advocates might leverage NCLB's race-conscious accountability
mechanisms).
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whether the NCLB approach will help close the achievement gap is still
unclear. Some critics claim that NCLB-which involves much tighter
benchmarking and accountability measures than DMC and mandates
sanctions for failure to meet goals-rests on unsupported assumptions
about the expected pace of educational reform and the efficacy of sanctions in prompting better educational practices. 19'
Other efforts are emerging to address racial disparities by providing
incentives to public institutions to gather information on the extent of
the problem and devise responsive solutions. For instance, states and localities have sought to address the complex problem of racial profiling by
police by mandating the collection of racial data on those subject to police stops. 1 9 2 Pending federal legislation would require state recipients of
federal funds to collect racial data information, and would fund model
reforms. Many of these efforts remain quite superficial, particularly when
compared to the DMC statute. 19 3 And while there appears to be a consensus against "racial profiling," upon closer examination much is contested, including the definition of racial profiling, 9 4 the standards on
191. See, e.g., Sunderman & Kim, Expansion of Federal Power, supra note 187, at 6.
Some commentators also claim that the subgroup accountability requirement harms
predominantly minority and integrated schools because they will have to make substantial
gains in order to meet the adequate yearly progress requirement and avoid sanctions, and
because they have to meet more achievement targets than predominantly white schools.
See Gail L. Sunderman & jimmy Kim, Large Mandates and Limited Resources: State
Response to the No Child Left Behind Act and Implications for Accountability 12-13
(2004), available at http://www.civilrightsproject.harvard.edu/research/esea/state-report
.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review); see also ThomasJ. Kane & Douglas 0. Staiger,
Racial Subgroup Rules in School Accountability Systems 21 (Sept. 27, 2002) (unpublished
manuscript, on file with the Columbia Law Review), available at http://www.sppsr.ucla.edu/
faculty/kane/kanestaigerracialsubgroupsrevision.pdf
(concluding that subgroup
accountability systems "arbitrarily single out schools with large minority subgroups for
sanctions and exclude them from awards . . . or statistically disadvantage diverse schools
that are more likely to be attended by minority students"). Civil rights groups have also
been divided about the law.
192. Twenty-five states currently have legislation mandating data collection, and at
least twenty states voluntarily collect data. See R. Richard Banks, Beyond Profiling: Race,
Policing, and the Drug War, 56 Stan. L. Rev. 571, 575 n.15 (2003) (noting extensive data
collection efforts by jurisdictions across country on law enforcement officers' stop-search
practices); Garrett, supra note 28, at 81-82 n.127 (same); Data Collection Res. Ctr.,
Northeastern Univ., Background and Current Data Collection Efforts: Jurisdictions
Currently Collecting Data, at http://www.racialprofilinganalysis.neu.edu/background/
jurisdictions.php (last visited Oct. 18, 2006) (on file with the Columbia Law Review)
(showing states with mandatory and voluntary data collection). Many police departments
also voluntarily collect data, largely in response to political pressures, see Garrett, supra
note 28, at 82 n.128, and federal law enforcement collects data under an executive order
issued in 1999 by President Clinton. See Memorandum on Fairness in Law Enforcement,
35 Weekly Comp. Pres. Doc. 1067 (June 9, 1999); Banks, supra, at 575 n.16.
193. See Garrett, supra note 28, at 83 (criticizing most state legislation as "incomplete
and vague").
194. See id. at 51-52 ("[A]ny definition of racial profiling is confounded by the
motivation of individual actors."); see also Samuel R. Gross & Debra Livingston, Racial
Profiling Under Attack, 102 Colum. L. Rev. 1413, 1415, 1416 n.6 (2002) (describing racial

2007]

DISPARITY RULES

collecting data and benchmarking, 195 and, particularly in the wake of
196
September 11, 2001, whether profiling is ever effective or justified.
Yet, the data collection requirements could potentially lead to greater
understanding of racial disparities in police-citizen contacts and partner19 7
ships with community groups to advance concrete reform efforts.
Similarly, advocates have recently focused attention on collecting information to understand and address racial disparities in social welfare
programs. In the wake of the 1996 changes to federal welfare for poor
198
families, known as Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF),
blacks and Latinos comprise a greater percentage of the welfare rolls
than before the 1996 law and are less likely to leave welfare than their
white counterparts. 19 9 As Congress seeks to reauthorize TANF, nongovernmental organizations have presented Congress with proposals that
would require states to track welfare outcomes according to race and
ethnicity in order to understand and address these disparities. 20 0 These
profiling as stops, arrests, searches, or investigations where "the officer believes that
members of that person's racial or ethnic group are more likely than the population at
large to commit the sort of crime the officer is investigating" and noting existence of
narrower definitions of racial profiling).
195. See Banks, supra note 192, at 581-86 (describing ambiguous meaning of
evidence of racial disparities in stop and search rates); Garrett, supra note 28, at 84-92
(indicating problems with scope and evaluation of data collection).
196. See, e.g., Gross & Livingston, supra note 194, at 1413-14 (describing how events
of September 11, 2001 changed public opinion on appropriateness of racial profiling); id.
at 1423-24 (describing shift in public opinion from eighty-one percent against racial
profiling to seventy-nine percent in favor of program targeting Arabs). Not all
commentators agree that the racial profiling campaign, with its focus on irrational police
practices and innocent victims, is the best emphasis. See Banks, supra note 192, at 602-03
(urging instead that policy analyses focus on race-specific consequences of drug war).
197. See Garrett, supra note 28, at 84-89, 115-40.
198. In 1996, Congress passed the Personal Responsibility and Work Reconciliation
Act (PRWORA), which replaced the Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC)
federal entitlement program for poor families with a block granted program known as
TANF (Temporary Assistance for Needy Families). See Personal Responsibility and Work
Reconciliation Act of 1996 (Welfare Reform Act), Pub. L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105
(codified in scattered sections of 7, 8, 20, 21, 25, and 42 U.S.C.). Eligible families can only
receive TANF aid for five years; nonexempt TANF recipients are required to participate in
work activities. PRWORA gives states flexibility, including allowing them to set their own
eligibility criteria, cap grants based on family size, determine exemptions from work
activities, and determine how and under what circumstances to sanction recipients who fail
to comply with work requirements or other rules.
199. See, e.g., Elizabeth Lower-Basch, U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., TANF
"Leavers," Applicants, and Caseload Studies: Preliminary Analysis of Racial Differences in
Caseload Trends and Leaver Outcomes fig.1 (Dec. 2000), available at http://
aspe.hhs.gov/hsp/leavers99/race.htm#figl (on file with the Columbia Law Review)
(documenting decrease in white families receiving TANF).
200. See, e.g., U.S. Comm'n on Civil Rights, A New Paradigm for Welfare Reform:
The Need for Civil Rights Enforcement (2002), at http://www.usccr.gov/pubs/prwora/
welfare.htm (on file with the Columbia Law Review) [hereinafter A New Paradigm for
Welfare Reform]; Letter from the ACLU to the U.S. House of Representatives Regarding
HR 4700, The Personal Responsibility, Work and Family Promotion Act of 2002 (May 14,

COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 107:374

efforts come in response to studies showing that minority applicants face
race-specific barriers in the administration of TANF. On one level, some
research points to differential treatment of minority TANF recipients:
Minorities receive sanctions for violations of program rules at higher
rates than white recipients who commit similar violations, 20 1 and minority
women are less likely to receive services, such as education and childcare,
that help promote successful transitions to higher-paying jobs.20 2 As with
racial disparities in the juvenile justice system, the root of racial disparities likely extends beyond bias in the administration of welfare programs
to race-specific opportunity structures. Blacks on welfare, the data suggests, may have less access to employment and childcare because they are
more likely to live in neighborhoods with fewer resources and higher
2002), available at http://www.aclu.org/rightsofthepoor/welfare/134391eg20020514.html
(on file with the Columbia Law Review). Researchers and advocates are also asking state
agencies to improve their data collection and monitoring. See, e.g., Racial and Ethnic
Disparities in the Era of Devolution, supra note 1, at 21-22 (calling for policy analysts and
researchers to work with state policymakers to improve data collection).
201. See, e.g., Dep't of Workforce Dev., State of Wis., Wisconsin Works (W-2)
Sanctions Study 10-11 (2004), available at http://www.dwd.state.wi.us/DWS/w2/pdf/
SanctionsFinalReport.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review). The Wisconsin study was
prompted by a Title VI OCR complaint filed by the ACLU of Wisconsin and the Milwaukee
Branch of the NAACP against the State of Wisconsin for, among other things,
discrimination in the application of sanctions. See Letter from Karyn Rotker, ACLU of
Wis., to Patricia Lucas, Office for Civil Rights, U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs. (Feb.
19, 2002), available at http://www.aclu-wi.org/wisconsin/rights-of-poor/ocrada.shtml
(on file with the Columbia Law Review) [hereinafter Letter from Karyn Rotker]. For
additional data on racial disparities in sanctions, see Kenneth Finegold & Sarah Staveteig,
Race, Ethnicity, and Welfare Reform, in Welfare Reform: The Next Act 203, 214-15 (Alan
Weil & Kenneth Finegold eds., 2002) (discussing survey indicating states with higher black
populations are also more likely to have adopted strong sanctions); A New Paradigm for
Welfare Reform, supra note 200 (discussing racial disparities uncovered in results from
survey on welfare recipients from thirteen states (citing Rebecca Gordon, Applied
Research Ctr., Cruel and Unusual: How Welfare "Reform" Punishes Poor People 5, 33-34
(2001), available at http://www.arc.org/pdf/285cpdf.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law
Review))); Racial and Ethnic Disparities in the Era of Devolution, supra note 1, at 13
(describing survey data from Wisconsin that shows higher percentages of blacks have had
food stamp benefits reduced or cut); see also id. at 20 (discussing disparities in use of
preemployment tests as condition of employment). Studies are often limited by the
paucity of available data, particularly on those who leave welfare. See id. at 16-21 (noting
gaps in data on racial and ethnic disparities).
202. See Gooden, supra note 1, at 27-30 (finding, based on survey of thirty-nine white
and black welfare recipients, disparate treatment by case worker with regard to job
notification, educational support, transportation assistance, and overall fairness); A New
Paradigm for Welfare Reform, supra note 200, at 3-4 (citing studies finding that minorities
on TANF have less access to social support services and that they are more likely to be
subject to sanctions and other punitive policies); Racial and Ethnic Disparities in the Era of
Devolution, supra note 1, at 15 (citing studies in Mississippi showing that whites were more
likely than blacks to receive help with job placement, childcare, transportation, mental
health counseling, and drug treatment). Under TANF, caseworkers have discretion in
connecting recipients to support services such as childcare and transportation, and
educational services such as GED services.
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concentrations of poverty, 203 are likely to face bias as they try to transition
from welfare to employment, 20 4 have less access to informal job networks,
and have thinner familial resources to draw upon for financial and social
supports.
Under current law, state agencies must comply with Title VI in the
administration of TANF, and individuals and groups can file Title VI
complaints to address bias in the administration of the program and practices with an unjustified disparate impact. 20 5 Nothing in the current
TANF structure, however, requires that states collect and disseminate
data by race or ethnicity on sanction rates or welfare leavers, for instance.
Nor does Title VI, by itself, encourage states to analyze how their own
policies interact with other barriers that minorities face. As with DMC, a
new approach would not simply attach civil rights law requirements-but
would uncover evidence of racial disparities, to promote transparency
and to develop solutions responsive to the complex factors at play.
Thus, in areas other than DMC, efforts exist to address racial disparity by encouraging institutions to be cognizant of racial impact-through
the collection and analysis of race-specific data-and to reform practices
that generate racial inequality. The examples are sufficiently different as
to warrant some caution in proclaiming a coherent model. Each effort to
generate information takes on a slightly different shape given the
context. Under DMC, research and data are collected to understand the
multiple contributors to racial disparities and to develop researchinformed solutions. Yet, in the area of racial profiling, as Richard Banks
and others have noted, data collection is often aimed merely at proving
or disproving the irrationality of racial profiling. 20 6 While proposals to
gather data and monitor racial impacts in TANF are oriented toward
avoiding bias as well as understanding the structural dimensions of racial
disparities, no proposal goes so far as to mandate that states take steps to
reduce racial disparities.
While it may be too early to proclaim that a new disparity model has
arrived, what the DMC and the models described above suggest is an
emerging, unarticulated normative reorientation of civil rights law at the
regulatory level. It suggests a shift to the realization that uncovering bias
is not the only way of addressing how racial disparities are generated.
203. Racial and Ethnic Disparities in the Era of Devolution, supra note 1, at 6-9
(reporting data on "sub-optimal living conditions" in states of Washington and New York).
204. See Finegold & Staveteig, supra note 201, at 212-13 (discussing obstacles, such as
employer discrimination, that minority welfare recipients face in trying to secure
employment).
205. For instance, the ACLU office in Wisconsin filed a Title VI complaint
challenging racial disparities in how the state agency granted time limits for welfare
receipt. See Letter from Karyn Rotker, supra note 201.
206. See Banks, supra note 192, at 577-80 (discussing several empirical arguments
aimed at demonstrating irrationality of racial profiling); see also Garrett, supra note 28, at
45, 86-87 (noting that data on racial profiling is often used solely to disprove racial
profiling or postpone reform).
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B. Enforcement Challenges
DMC and the models discussed in the previous Part are not, of
course, enforced primarily by the judiciary. As discussed above, the federal government has the power to withhold a percentage of funds from
states that fail to comply with the DMC requirement, and the federal government has used that power in recent years. In addition, some states
have adopted implementing legislation to further the goal of reducing
racial disparities in juvenile justice. 20 7 State compliance is also procured,
as detailed earlier, by the work of internal advocates and by pressure and
cooperation from external groups. Indeed, the DMC statute and funding
scheme quite explicitly build in involvement of nongovernmental organizations as collaborators, thus maintaining pressure for reform. The effectiveness of external efforts to secure compliance is of course contingent
on the political landscape in particular states, the existence of internal
reform agents, the skill of the nongovernmental organizations in applying political pressure and educating the public, and the facility of engaging the public. These factors will differ depending on the issue at hand.
The potential role of the judiciary in securing compliance under this
regime is unclear. For instance, in theory the federal government could
be sued for completely failing to enforce the DMC statute. 20 8 States that
have adopted legislation implementing DMC could be challenged under
state law for failing to comply with specific requirements. In addition, as
best practices and model approaches to combating racial disparities become known, plaintiffs could have some success with deliberate indifference claims. A state's failure to adopt proven methods for addressing
racial disparity after being made aware of these alternatives could raise an
20 9
inference of intent.
Ultimately, however, the question is whether the model's strength
depends on the limited role it grants the judiciary. As a practical matter,
Congress or state legislatures may be reluctant to include explicit private
rights of action. For instance, on the federal level, NCLB failed to include a private right of action for the accountability provisions as part of a
political compromise. Beyond the politics, a tension might be created by
requiring states to generate information about a problem, engage in a
difficult process of discovering solutions, and then authorize them to be
subject to suit. A compromise position would allow a private right of action for states that fail to comply with the statute's requirements by, in the
207. See, e.g., DMC 2002 Update, supra note 128, at 21-24 (describing legislative
efforts in Washington State).
208. See, e.g., Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 832, 833 & n.4 (1985) (stating that
while agency action not to take enforcement action is presumptively unreviewable,
presumption is rebuttable where statute provides guidelines and agency consciously
abdicates responsibility to enforce statute).
209. See Pryor v. NCAA, 288 F.3d 548, 564-65 (3d Cir. 2002) (holding that Feeney did
not bar deliberate indifference claim at motion to dismiss stage); cf. S. Camden Citizens in
Action v. NJ. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., 254 F. Supp. 2d 486, 497-99 (D.N.J. 2003) (same).
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context of DMC for instance, failing to evaluate racial disparities or to
develop a remedial plan. A safe harbor would be created, however, for
states that are producing information and taking steps to address the
problem.
Another concern is that legislation on issues of race and civil rights is
not easy to pass at either the state or the federal level. Indeed, the same
forces that make public officials indifferent to particular racial disparities
will come into play. This likely means that passage of legislation will require some minimum social or legal consensus about the existence of a
particular problem, and more specifically about the kinds of racial impacts one is willing to tolerate. Here, the story of the passage of DMC is
instructive. The legislation built political support based on research
showing that racial disparities in juvenile dispositions could not be explained solely by differences in criminal activity. What began as a concern about arbitrariness transformed into a general concern about minority overrepresentation, which then produced a standard that seeks to
address both unjustified disparity as well as simple overrepresentation.
However, because the public is likely to be willing to tolerate some racial
disparities in juvenile justice outcomes in the interest of reducing crime,
arguments that the disparities are not justified by the rate of crime commission must continually be remade to sustain the legislation. 2 10 In other
areas, such as education, where there is arguably a greater consensus on
equity as a goal, arguments based solely on disparities might be sufficient
2 11
to support disparity legislation.
C. Disparity-ReducingJustice
The DMC model raises a final question about the meaning of using
racial disparity as a point of intervention. In other contexts, commentators have argued that disparate impact does not provide a strong basis for
civil rights intervention. Ian Ayres, for instance, makes this argument
largely on pragmatic grounds, believing that disparate impact provides
too weak a basis for political organizing, in contrast to particularized evi210. See, e.g., supra note 125.
211. DMC and similar models rely heavily on data collection on the basis of race and
ethnicity, which raises constitutional and policy concerns. Such data collection is
controversial in many quarters, most famously exemplified by the recent unsuccessful
effort to abolish the collection of racial data in California. See generally Richa Amar,
Note, Unequal Protection and the Racial Privacy Initiative, 52 UCLA L. Rev. 1279, 1281-93
(2005) (describing California's "Racial Privacy Initiative" (RPI), including its defeat by
popular vote in 2003, and arguing even modified RPI would have violated Equal Protection
Clause). There may also be constitutional objections to racial data collection or to the
creation of racial incentives based on race. But unless the Supreme Court adopts a view
that prohibits all race consciousness, most of the actions taken under these disparity
regimes are unlikely to sufficiently harm another racial group to justify standing or
heightened review. One could imagine extreme examples-for instance redirecting all
government resources to minorities or arresting only white juveniles to "cure" racial
disparities-but as a practical matter states are unlikely to take such steps.

COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 107:374

dence of continuing disparate racial treatment. 21 2 Similarly, Michael
Selmi argues that in the employment context disparate impact theory
mistakenly shifts attention away from the persistence of disparate treatment discrimination. 2 13 These arguments point to the hazards of the disparity framing, which can obscure the role of both past and present intentional discrimination in accounting for contemporary racial
inequality.
The example of DMC, however, reveals a more complex role for disparity arguments. As detailed in the prior section, a virtue of the disparity
frame is that it has the power to encompass racial inequities caused by
disparate treatment-typically understood as bias-as well as by racespecific differences in opportunity structures. Moreover, as a descriptive
matter, remedying racial disparity might be sufficient to provide a basis
for civil rights intervention, at least where there is some empirical evidence of racially disparate outcomes for similarly situated groups. As occurred with DMC, one could propel disparity remedies by presenting evidence to policymakers that race (as opposed to some other factor)
continues to be salient in explaining differences in social outcomes in
particular areas, rather than relying on the broad notion of institutional
2 14
discrimination.
The disparity frame has the power to propel social intervention if
racial disparities are revealed as generated by public policies and institutions. Empirical evidence about the mechanisms that sustain racial inequality can then unsettle notions that these inequalities are inevitable,
something to be expected. While society might not understand disparities as a normative wrong on the same scale as that of intentional discrimination, many racial disparities can begin to be understood as arbitrary,
215
unjustified, and unnecessary.

212. See Ayres, Pervasive Prejudice, supra note 43, at 426 ("[Ulnjustified disparate
impacts are an appropriate concern for law and policy, [but] I do not believe that they
provide as firm a moral basis for political organizing.").
213. See Selmi, Mistake, supra note 9, at 782 ("[A] broader judicial definition of
intent would not have led to less inequality, but it may have opened our eyes to the
persistence of discrimination in a way that the disparate impact theory could not.").
214. This is not entirely inconsistent with Ayres's argument that providing empirical
evidence of "race-contingent" behavior counters arguments that race no longer matters
and thus can help spur reforms. See Ayres, Pervasive Prejudice, supra note 43, at 426
("[V]isual images of disparate treatment . . . are the key to convincing whites that
unjustified race-contingent behavior persists in the modem marketplace.").
215. As Loury has suggested, if race itself is a social construct then racial disparities
are also constructed by society. See Loury, Racial Inequality, supra note 12, at 5
(describing "race" as "a socially constructed mode of human categorization" and racial
disparity as "a social artifact-a product of the peculiar history, culture, and political
economy of American society").
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CONCLUSION

The virtue of the DMC approach is its potential to prompt public
institutions to consider how to address racial disparity, less constrained by
the concern about cabining public responsibility that I argue has hampered the judicial regime. Rather than abandon civil rights legislation as
necessarily ineffective in addressing complex, systemic inequality, examination of the DMC approach might lead scholars, policymakers, and advocates concerned about racial inequity to consider the efficacy of the
new forms of civil rights regulatory interventions that we see emerging
today. These interventions are not always recognized by commentators as
civil rights laws, since their mandate extends beyond remedying discrimination. Nongovernmental organizations, too, will have to reshape their
advocacy strategies to make these new approaches meaningful. The ingredients of this new form of advocacy are already evident in the work of
the organizations working on DMC. In the absence of a clear avenue for
judicial enforcement, nongovernmental organizations are undertaking
strategies to broaden political support for reforms to reduce DMC, exposing the failures of states that have made inadequate progress, and highlighting best practices for reducing disparities in minority confinement.
Of course these efforts are relatively young, and more remains to be seen
about whether the DMC strategy is successful in reducing disparities in
minority involvement in the juvenile justice system.

